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SCORN NOT THE SONNET:  IN SEARCH OF SHAKESPEARE=S LAW1
Legal scholars love Shakespeare.  I don=t mean simply that we love to quote him.  
Everyone loves to quote him.2  What I mean is that we love to use his works as stimuli and even
models for legal analysis.  We write about King Lear or The Merchant of Venice but rarely about
the Sonnets.3  Why is that?
When legal scholars turn to Shakespeare=s plays for inspiration, we focus on the plays= 
content B the division of a kingdom, the enforcement of a contract B and unfortunately the
Sonnets, being lyric poetry, have no content:  at least not what legal scholars are trained to think
of as content.  For example, one of Shakespeare=s most famous sonnets (the AFortune and men=s
eyes@ one) can be summed up as, AWhen I=m feeling depressed, I think about you, and that cheers
me up.@  Another (the Amarriage of true minds@ one) might easily be reduced to a single one of its
tropes:  ALove is not love / Which alters when it alteration finds.@  And each of the first seventeen
sonnets seems to be merely a plea to a handsome young man to sire children so that his good
looks will not die out with him.  How is a legal scholar to find intellectual nourishment in such
seemingly insipid fare?
If a scholar probes the Sonnets for autobiographical revelation or social controversy, she
can expect to come up empty.4  A Shakespeare sonnet is a kind of performance, but a
performance in which the actors are not persons but words.5  These words perform by
elaborating upon themselves (and each other), by contradicting, by equivocating, by mutating,6 
by ironizing, by punning, by self-regarding, and (sometimes) by rhyming.  John Ciardi=s famous
book-title How Does a Poem Mean? puts the matter elegantly, for a poem does not convey
meaning the way prose conveys it.  That is, a prose paraphrase of a poem does not mean what the
poem means, even if the poem and the paraphrase share the same Apropositional content.@7  The
meaning of a poem consists in its delivery of meaning.  One should regard it as an aesthetic
mechanism whose moving parts are words and whose function is to mirror a state of mind.
Observing how the machine functions B noting its strategies of presentation B is the poetry-reader
=s task and also her reward.
But why sonnets?  They amount to only a small share of lyric poetry.  It is all very well to
say that a lyric poet uses words as actors, but why should he adopt the sonnet form for his
performance?  Two reasons come to mind.  First, a sonnet is a display of technical skill, like a
fugue, and writing a sonnet allows the poet to demonstrate his writing chops.  The sonnet form is
strict and unyielding, comprising fourteen lines of iambic pentameter with one of several rhyme
schemes:  most often abbaabbacdecde, abbaabbacdcdcd, ababbcbccdcdee, or ababcdcdefefgg 
(Shakespeare=s rhyme scheme).  To write graceful, satisfying poetry in such fetters is no easy
task.  One of Percy Bysshe Shelley=s most famous poems, AOzymandias@, is a sonnet, and the
very form of the poem contrasts ironically with the vainglory of the poem=s long-dead king
whose monumental statue now lies in ruins.  ALook on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!@ reads
the inscription on the abandoned pedestal.8  ALook on my works,@ the sonneteer Shelley seems to
reply.  AThe architecture of the written word outlasts the architecture of stone.  The achievements
of the human mind surpass the achievements of power.@9
The second reason for writing sonnets is more difficult to put into words but nicely
captured by William Wordsworth in a sonnet of his own:  ANuns Fret Not at Their Convent=s
Narrow Room:@10
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In sundry moods, >twas pastime to be bound
Within the sonnet=s scanty plot of ground;
Pleased if some souls (for such there needs must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find brief solace there, as I have found.
To modern ears Wordsworth=s Aweight of too much liberty@ sounds more like the sloganeering of
a totalitarian apologist than the ruminating of a romantic poet.  But if we allow our imaginations
to wander a bit, we can, I think, come to discern the Asolace@ that restrictions afford.  The
availability of too many choices can paralyze.  When a high school English teacher asks his class
to write an essay and his students ask him to specify the subject matter, they are likely to regard A
your summer vacation@ as a more helpful response than Awhatever you want.@  Visiting a
museum with an enormous collection can be overwhelming, while visiting one with a small
collection can be reassuring.  And a sense of limitation enhances pleasure.  A game without rules
or boundaries is no game at all.  I often think that legal scholars who choose to write about tax
law rather than, say, international law have known the solace of which Wordsworth speaks.
I have characterized the Sonnets as intellectual exercises,11 but I do not use that phrase
disparagingly, for the intellect I am talking about is, after all, Shakespeare=s.  These poems are
not sermons or dissertations written for our improvement; indeed, I cannot think of any literary
project more alien to Shakespeare.  An account of these Sonnets that fails to embrace their
internal shiftings and self-contradictions, but instead attempts to reconcile or excuse them,
misses the poems= quality completely and reduces them to pabulum.  In his novel Nineteen
Eighty-Four, Orwell coined the term Adoublethink@, meaning the capacity of Aholding two
contradictory beliefs in one=s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.@12  He
obviously regarded doublethink as unnatural and destructive:  something that can flourish only
when a totalitarian regime=s thought-control techniques successfully destroy our capacity to
make reasoned judgments.  But to the poet, doublethink can be a gift.  John Keats, in a letter to
his brothers, coined the term ANegative Capability@ to describe a quality that he considered
indispensable to a great poet:  the Acapab[ility] of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.@13  And he went on to observe that it was a A
quality . . . which Shakespeare possessed so enormously.@14  Negative Capability permits its
possessor to remain comfortable with the disorder and incongruities of the human condition
without striving to impose on them a coherent, unified system of understanding.  Yet lawyers
strive to do precisely what those with Negative Capability resist.  Lawyers do strive to discover
or create system.  Lawyers are Airrita[ted]@ by mystery and do Areach after fact and reason.@
Why, then, should lawyers and legal scholars care about Shakespeare at all, given his A
enormous[]@ indifference to the certainty and perfection toward which they aspire?  Shakespeare=
s appeal springs from two elements:  the extraordinary breadth and acuity of his sympathies and
the extraordinary beauty and power of his language.  As to the first, his delicate and forbearing
understanding of human motive and serves to remind us that law is directed not at abstractions
but at particular, complicated human beings15 and that justice is not an attainable goal but
merely a direction.16  As to the second, Shakespeare can teach us to read like lawyers.  When
writing for the theatre, Shakespeare wrote not to be read but to be heard; and while readers read
for Ameaning,@ listeners generally listen merely for Asense.@  In the theatre, we can still enjoy
Portia=s bitchy catalog of her unwelcome suitors without knowing quite what she means by 
he borrowed a box of the ear of the Englishman, and swore he would pay him
again when he was able.  I think the Frenchman became his surety and seal=d under for
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another.17
But we do not have the same luxury B i.e., attending only to Asense@ B with the Sonnets.
Shakespeare, Athe most hyperconscious of writers,@18 wrote them to be read, and so in a sonnet=s
140 syllables every word must signify.19  And lawyers are at least supposed to read the way
sonnets are supposed to be read:  Every pronoun must be satisfactorily linked in the reader=s
mind with the pronoun=s antecedent;20 every shift in number or tense must be digested.  In other
words, the Sonnets can teach lawyers to read and think closely, the way lawyers ought to read
and think.
In this article, I propose to examine three of Shakespeare=s sonnets and illustrate how a
legal scholar or law professor might use these sonnets as scholarly or pedagogical vehicles.
These illustrations will not discuss legal issues to a point of conclusion but will simply present
some legal issues as analytic opportunities offered by a close reading of the Sonnets.
I.  Sonnet 35
Let us begin with a sonnet that seems rather surprisingly to take much of its imagery from
the law.  In it, we find legalistic phrases like adverse party and lawful plea as well as lay words
clearly freighted with specialized legal meaning:  authorizing, trespass, fault, advocate, 
accessary.21  Sonnet 35 is one of the so-called Young Man sonnets, wherein the speaker
addresses his beloved:  a young man of extraordinary physical beauty but somewhat questionable
virtue and fidelity.
122No more be grieved at that which thou hast done:
2Roses have thorns, and silver fountains mud,
3Clouds and eclipses stain both moon and sun,
4And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.
5All men make faults, and even I in this,
6Authórizing thy trespass with compare,
7My self corrupting salving thy amiss,
8Excusing thy sins more than thy sins are;
9For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense B 
10Thy adverse party is thy advocate B 
11And =gainst myself a lawful plea commence.
12Such civil war is in my love and hate
13 That I an áccessary needs must be
14 To that sweet thief which sourly robs from me.
Lines 2-4 comprise a series of platitudes about the flaws that inhere in beautiful things, and Line
1 suggests strongly that these platitudes are addressed by the speaker to his beloved.  Evidently,
the speaker had on previous occasions reproached the beloved for his conduct (that which thou
has done), and evidently those reproaches hit home.  But in this first quatrain the speaker tells
the beloved not to feel ashamed any more (No more be grieved), because it is only natural that
the beloved B being a thing of beauty, like a rose B should have his thorns.  But the speaker=s
platitudes in this first quatrain grow progressively more bitter.  A lover might not feel stung
when told that he is a rose with thorns, but he is likely to feel crushed when told that he has a
disgusting canker worm inside him, even if sweetest somewhat softens the blow by suggesting
that cankers always choose the sweetest flowers as their victim.23  Furthermore, the
connotations of the two images are quite different.  A rose=s thorns do not undermine the rose,
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while a canker certainly does undermine its host.  One senses that the speaker, in offering these
mitigative bromides to his lover, is not being entirely genuine when he protests that he wants his
lover to cease grieving.
The rhyme scheme of the first quatrain is the rhyme scheme Shakespeare used in all his sonnets:  
abab.  Yet when the quatrain is read aloud, all four lines are revealed to feature the same vowel
sound:  ß (the short u).  Done, Mud, Sun, Bud.  This effect is known as a vowel rhyme,24 and as
used in this sonnet it gives the four lines a weary, monotonic sound, as if the speaker is reciting
the words by rote rather than speaking from his heart.  Thus, the very sound of the lines
reinforces our impression that the speaker=s words so far are not to be taken at face value.25
The next quatrain represents a complete change in tone, but in fact it helps to explain our
reaction to the first quatrain.  In the second quatrain, the speaker finally starts to speak about
himself instead of in abstractions.  After acknowledging that all men commit sins (make faults),
the speaker says that he himself (even I) has sinned.  The speaker=s sin, says he, consists in his
having justified or excused (authoriz[ed]) his beloved=s misconduct.  Presumably, this justifying
or excusing often took the form of citing B either to himself or to his beloved B those mitigative
platitudes with which the sonnet begins.  Thus, the platitudes in the first quatrain are now, in the
second quatrain, being recalled or quoted with some bitterness by the speaker:  recalled now as
earlier manifestations of the speaker=s own sin.  Perhaps in that earlier time, the speaker spoke to
his beloved less bitterly (i.e., nothing about cankers) and more sincerely (no vowel rhymes) than
his recollections suggest.  He tells us in line 12 that feelings of love and hate struggle within
him; so perhaps love was in the ascendancy when the speaker originally uttered some mitigative
sentiments, and only now, when hate is in the ascendancy, does the speaker=s memory sabotage
those earlier remarks to the beloved.
In lines 6-8, the speaker reels off his own sins as a catalog of present participles:  Authorizing thy
trespass, salving thy amiss,26 Excusing thy sins.  But the overall meaning of line 8 is somewhat
obscure.27  I read it this way:  the speaker is saying that he enlisted his excuse-making powers so
profligately and sophistically on behalf of his beloved that the speaker=s excuse-making would
have sufficed to pardon sins even more serious (or more numerous) than those the beloved
actually committed.  The very excessiveness of the speaker=s excuse-making may even have
been a greater sin than the beloved=s sins being excused.  In other words, the speaker has not
merely forgiven the beloved=s sins.  That would be nothing to be ashamed of.  The speaker
laments that he has gone beyond mere forgiveness and has entered the domain of complicity.28  
That is, he did not see his lover=s misdeeds for what they were at the time the lover committed
them but then, out of love, gone on to forgive the lover=s misdeeds.  Rather, he allowed his
feelings of love to cause him to overlook the misdeeds when they occurred.  Instead of saying to
himself, AThat=s a misdeed, but I forgive it,@ the speaker said to himself, AThat=s not a misdeed at
all, so there=s nothing to forgive.@
Among the three present participles in the speaker=s catalog of his own sins lies a fourth present
participle, corrupting (line 7), but this fourth participle is a changeling.  It applies not to the
conscious acts of the speaker (authorizing, salving, excusing) but to the consequences of those
conscious acts.  All that authorizing, salving, and excusing on behalf of the beloved has had the
effect of corrupting the speaker:  specifically, corrupting the speaker=s self.  In line 7, the speaker
does not use the word Amyself@ in line 7; he uses the two words my self.  The single word Amyself
@ is just a fancy substitute for Ame@, but the two words my self posit the existence of something
fundamental but separable from the human organism that is the speaker.  Thus, the speaker
accuses himself of betraying his very personhood.
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The last six lines (or Asestet@) of this sonnet contain almost all of the poem=s legal imagery.  Now
critics seldom speak of a sestet in the context of a Shakespeare sonnet.  Most Shakespeare
sonnets comprise three quatrains of more-or-less equal thematic weight (the last of which ends
with a period), followed by a couplet:  a new sentence, more pointed and less allusive than any
of the preceding sentences, that the reader experiences as a resolution of the sonnet=s action.29  
Thus, inasmuch as the final couplet does not relate particularly to the third quatrain any more
than to the first or second, the reader of a Shakespeare sonnet rarely experiences the last six lines
as a unit.30  But the last six lines of this Sonnet 35 are very different.  From adverse party to
internal civil war to out-and-out accomplice (accessary), the ferocity of the speaker=s
self-reproach gathers such momentum that ultimately it bursts the bonds of the last quatrain and
overruns the couplet as well.
In the sestet=s first line, we learn that the beloved=s misconduct was sexual (sensual31) in nature 
B perhaps promiscuity, perhaps sexual betrayal (sleeping with the speaker=s mistress32) B and
that the speaker=s reaction to that sexual misconduct was not the emotional or visceral response
we might expect but rather an intellectual one (I bring in sense).33  Even though the speaker is
the injured party B the plaintiff, as it were B he enlists his intellect to justify the beloved=s
injurious conduct to him, just as if he were the defendant-beloved=s lawyer in a lawsuit brought
by himself (Thy adverse party is thy advocate [line 10]).  Indeed, he goes beyond acting as the
defendant=s lawyer and becomes his own prosecutor (>gainst myself a lawful plea commence [line
11]),34 presumably for the offense of authorizing, salving, and excusing (lines 6-8) the beloved
when he should instead have been honoring his own true nature and interests.  Moreover, he
enters this self-condemning plea on compulsion (I . . . needs must [line 13]), not by choice.  And
the source of the speaker=s compulsion is perhaps the violence of his conflicted feelings (civil
war . . . in my love and hate [line 12]):  love for his beloved coupled with hate for the man who 
sourly robs [line 14] him of his self. [line 7].35
Let us turn now to an examination of the ways in which a law scholar or teacher might use this
sonnet as a jumping-off point for her projects.
a.  My self
The notion of an essential self separable from the human organism containing it figures
prominently in a pair of conversations central to Robert Bolt=s splendid play A Man for All
Seasons.  Sir Thomas More and the Duke of Norfolk are discussing More=s refusal to ratify King
Henry=s arrogation of the office of head of the Church in England in contravention of the Roman
Catholic doctrine of the apostolic succession of the Pope.36  Norfolk dismisses the doctrine as a
mere Atheory@ and asks More how he can justify throwing away his position and even his life in
defense of it.  More replies:
[I]t=s a theory, yes. . . .  But what matters to me is not whether it=s true or not but that I believe it
to be true, or rather not that I believe it but that I believe it. . . . I will not give in because I
oppose it B I do B not my pride, not my spleen, nor any other of my appetites, but I do B I.
37
In the same way, the speaker in Sonnet 35 might have said, AMy sin consisted not in my having 
corrupted myself but in my having corrupted my self.@
But loyalty to one=s essential self is not necessarily admirable.  What despot or bigot or bully or
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scoundrel could not accurately say along with Thomas More, ABut what matters to me is not
whether it=s true or not but that I believe it to be true@?38  What unashamed segregationist or
killer of abortion-providers could not accurately say along with More, AI will not give in because
I oppose it B I do B not my pride not my spleen, nor any other of my appetites, but I do B I@?39  
As private citizens we may, from a philosophical or aesthetic standpoint, applaud the courage
and self-reliance of such recusants, but as a civil society of laws can we afford to treat the mere
sincerity and vehemence of a person=s beliefs as justification for her violation of those laws?
Until we can trust those laws to distinguish among Antigone before Creon, Luther before the
Diet of Worms, and George Wallace crying ASegregation Forever@ before the doors of the
Alabama state capitol, perhaps the safer answer to that question is no.
One branch of legal doctrine, however, answers that question in the affirmative:  the doctrine of
conscientious objection to military conscription.  A man claiming an exemption on such grounds
is, in effect, asserting his self.  In a statutory construction case, Welsh v. United States,40 which
involved a statutory exemption for men whose objections to military service were founded on A
religious training and belief@ as distinguished from Apolitical, sociological, or philosophic views,
or a merely personal moral code,@41 the United States Supreme Court held that even a man who
disavowed belief in any acknowledged religion could qualify for the exemption.  The Court
supported its decision by noting that the petitioner was responding not to the Astill, small voice of
conscience@ but rather to a voice that was Aloud and insistent;@42 that his beliefs were Aheld with
the strength of traditional religious convictions;43 and that they did not rest upon Aconsiderations
of policy, pragmatism or expediency.@44  Or, to use Thomas More=s words, they did not rest
upon Amy pride, . . . my spleen, [or] any other of my appetites.@45
This self of which the sonnet=s speaker is so solicitous is not a unitary self; it is conflicted.  It
loves and it hates simultaneously.  Yet some legal rules are premised unrealistically on the
existence of unmixed motives.  Suppose a father bequeaths to his daughter a life estate in trust
but provides that the daughter will receive the trust property outright if she and her current
husband divorce.  Some courts have held that if the divorce condition was motivated by the
father=s desire to encourage the daughter to divorce her husband, the condition is void on public
policy grounds, and the daughter will receive the property outright immediately.  But if the
condition was motivated by a desire to provide extra property for the daughter in the event the
principal breadwinner ceased to be obligated to support her, the condition is valid.46  I have
argued elsewhere that a testator=s motive should be irrelevant in determining the validity of a
testamentary condition.47  Here I would simply call attention to Sonnet 35's warning that we are
complicated creatures with complicated motives; the testator in my example might conceivably
have had two motives:  encouraging divorce and protecting his daughter against impoverishment.
b.  Compare
Shakespeare=s speaker in the sonnet includes among his sins Authorizing thy trespass with
compare:  that is, justifying the beloved=s misdeeds by comparing them with other misdeeds and
finding the former to be less serious.48  This form of justification is disingenuous and corrupt.
One can always envisage a crime more serious than the one under examination, so by the logic
of this comparative approach to culpability every crime should be excused and nothing is
forbidden.  Sometimes the comparative approach is relatively harmless, as when a driver stopped
for speeding rebukes the police officer, AWhy aren=t you out catching murderers?@  But
sometimes this approach is put to more destructive uses.  When news surfaced of Atlanta Falcons
quarterback Michael Vick=s likely involvement in a dog-fighting ring, defenders and spin-doctors
Copyright 8 2010 by Jeffrey G. Sherman
 
argued that the vehemence of the widespread condemnation of Vick was misplaced because,
they said (in effect), AIt=s just dogs.  It=s not as if he had beaten his wife or driven while
intoxicated.@49  If Vick had beaten his wife, imagine our outrage if his defenders had argued, AIt
was just a beating.  It=s not as if he actually killed her.@
Sometimes defenders and spin-doctors use deliberately false comparisons as a way of
minimizing an offense.  For example, at about the same time as the Vick affair the University of
California at Irvine offered the deanship of its new law school to a well-known liberal scholar,
Erwin Chemerinsky.  A week later, the University withdrew the offer on the ground that
Chemerinsky was Atoo politically controversial.@50  When the withdrawal provoked almost
universal cries of outrage from Alegal scholars across the political spectrum,@51 the University
rescinded its rescission and Chemerinsky accepted the offer.  Shortly thereafter, the University=s
chancellor, who earlier had personally flown to Chemerinsky=s home to withdraw the offer,
dismissed concerns that the contentiousness of the hiring process might have profound
implications for the University by saying AEvery relationship has bumps,@52 as if the turmoil had
been a romantic spat instead of a battle for the soul of an institution and as if withdrawing an
offer for political reasons were an unremarkable misunderstanding to which all universities are a
party at one time or another.
While comparisons sometimes mislead, one special kind of comparison  B the analogy B can
sometimes illuminate.  The United States military=s longstanding administrative ban on gay
people in the armed forces was given statutory form in 1993 as a compromise policy popularly
known as Adon=t ask; don=t tell.@53  Under this policy, the military was instructed not to inquire
into a soldier=s sexual orientation, so a discreet gay person was permitted to serve; but once that
soldier Aopenly and avowedly@ declared his homosexuality, the military was instructed to
discharge him.  This amended policy, targeting only known gay people, made explicit what had
been merely implicit before:  that the military seeks to exclude gay people not because it thinks
they make bad soldiers but because it is afraid nongay soldiers will hate them once they learn of
their sexual orientation.54  Speaking against allowing gay people in the armed services, a
representative of the Non-Commissioned Officers Association warned that the presence of gay
people would hurt other soldiers= morale:
Morale in the armed forces is a fragile asset.  It can be instantly destroyed even by those acting
with the best intentions.  History has proven that the degradation of morale quickly leads
to the erosion of discipline, diminished performance, poor retention, readiness reduction
and recruiting difficulties.  NCOA submits . . . that any change in [the military=s anti-gay]
policy will most assuredly have identical results. . . . I cannot think of a better way to
destroy fighting spirit and gut U.S. combat morale.55
This argument is the same kind of blame-the-victim argument used in the 1930s and 1940s to
justify separating African-American soldiers from other soldiers.  Indeed, opponents of racial
integration in the military used almost the same words later used to oppose a gay presence in the
military:
The close and intimate conditions of life aboard ship, the necessity for the highest possible
degree of unity and esprit-de-corps; the requirement of morale B all these demand that
nothing be done which may adversely affect the situation.  Past experience has shown
irrefutably that the enlistment of Negroes (other than for mess attendants) leads to
disruptive and undermining conditions.56
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To me, the analogy is a strong one and a useful way of showing opponents of gays in the military
how wrongheaded their arguments are.  Both the anti-black exclusion in the 1940s and the
anti-gay exclusion in the 1990s derive from Apopular prejudices, nourished by deeply entrenched
mythologies.@57  Both impose the costs of prejudice on the victims of prejudice.  Both
presuppose that the best response to hatred is to shut out the hated.58
Yet when this analogic argument is presented on behalf of gay people wishing to serve, some
African-American leaders reject the analogy by saying that race, unlike homosexuality, is a A
benign@ characteristic without Abehavioral@ ramifications,59 the implication being that while
aversion to black people is unjustified, aversion to gay people is not.  Such objections sadly
ignore the historical fact that blackness was not always regarded as a benign characteristic and
that aversion to gay people is defended with the same kind of language once used to justify
aversion to black people, including the canard that they cannot control their sexual impulses.60  
But as a matter of strict logic, the objection does undermine the persuasiveness of the analogic
argument; for if the hatred of gay people and the hatred of black people are not analogous, the
argument collapses.
Surprisingly, though, those who reject the analogy argue not simply that it is logically unsound
but that it is insulting to black people.  A[T]o lump blacks with homosexuals,@ wrote one
commentator, Ais an affront to most African Americans.@61  The insult, according to such critics,
consists in the unfounded assumption that the suffering of gay people at the hands of the
heterosexual majority has been equal  B in both intensity and iniquity B to the suffering of black
people at the hands of the white majority, whereas in fact (say such critics) black oppression has
been worse than gay oppression.62  This kind of compare B to use Sonnet 35's word B troubles
me greatly because it assumes that reform is a zero-sum game, that degrees of oppression can be
calibrated, and that only the most demonstrably oppressed group is morally entitled to demand
justice.  African-American journalist Clarence Page calls this argument Aone-downs-manship,@63 
and it can undermine the aspirations of the very people who use it, allowing their adverse
part[ies] (the Sonnet=s words again) to stand back and watch.  When black people and gay
people argue about which group has been more victimized, the only people who benefit from the
controversy are people who are neither black nor gay.  When black people and women argue
about which group has been more oppressed,64 the only people who benefit are those who are
neither black nor female.
Despite the objections to compare[s], neither the poet nor the lawyer can do without them.  The
most common poetic figures of speech B similes and metaphors B are comparisons, and Sonnet
35 relies heavily upon them.  Although the speaker, in the second quatrain, retrospectively
rejects the comparisons he had previously made, he goes on in the sestet to construct an elaborate
lattice of fresh metaphors comparing his conduct to that of parties to a lawsuit.  And while
Shakespeare, on other occasions, mocks grandiloquent hyperboles,65 in line 12 he employs one
humdinger of a hyperbole:  one to which a soldier wounded at Antietem or Gettysburg might
take exception.  Lawyers, too, would be lost without compare[s].  The very notion of precedent
recognizes that while two sets of facts are never identical, they may nonetheless be compar
[able].
c.  The Plasticity of Words
Shakespeare frequently reshapes nouns into verbs,66 but an artist of his range and genius is
granted a certain degree of license in the anthimeria department.67  When the more ordinary
among us make the same attempt, the results are rarely felicitous.  When Margaret Mitchell, in
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her novel Gone with the Wind, put the phrase Abirthin= babies@ into the mouth of one of her
characters, she intended her readers to take this mutation of the noun Abirth@ as a solecism
delineative of the enslaved teen-ager who uttered it.68  But by some perverse corollary of
Gresham=s Law, this solecism has now become chic, and today one frequently finds the directors
of what might be called Abirth centers@ christening their facilities B with considerable
self-satisfaction B Abirthing centers,@69 perhaps to suggest a primordial connectedness with
Mother Earth.
Sometimes, however, this kind of anthimeria reflects not ignorance or pomposity but a happy
rethinking of an old concept.  I have in mind using the word Alawyer@ as a verb:  not, as it once
was, as a disparaging term meaning Ato subject (someone) to the ministrations of a lawyer@ (as in 
AI=ve been lawyered to death@), but rather as an impersonal term meaning Ato perform the
functions of a lawyer.@  I first encountered this usage (in the form of a gerund) in the title of the
late Gary Bellow and Bea Molton=s book The Lawyering Process,70 and the usage may have
revolutionized B or at least assisted in revolutionizing B legal education.  Traditionally, a lawyer=
s quality was thought to be simply a matter of knowledge and judgment, the first of which could
be acquired in law school and the second in practice.  But the new gerund Alawyering@ suggests
that a lawyer=s quality is also a matter of technique.  And the technique of lawyering, like all
other techniques, is also something that can be acquired in school.  This new understanding of
technique has led to a profusion of Askills@ courses such as negotiation and trial practice.
Although considerable disagreement still exists among legal educators as to the amount of skills
instruction that law students should receive, there is widespread agreement that they should
receive at least some.  The coining of Alawyering@ has created an educational specialty.  Life
imitates art.
Another noun-to-verb transformation has produced mixed results:  the verb Aparent@ and its
gerund, Aparenting@.71  The popularization of Aparenting@ usefully informs parents that raising a
child, like practicing law, is in part a matter of skill B skill that can be acquired B and it reminds
them of the enormous formative influence that they exert over their progeny.  This is all to the
good.  But it can also engender in parents a paralyzing self-consciousness, leading them to regard
every burp or diaper-change as a turning point of Sophoclean portentousness.  Doctor Spock=s
best-selling book Baby and Child Care, on which Baby Boomers= parents famously relied, began
with the reassuring sentence, AYou know more than you think you do,@72 encouraging new
parents to trust their instincts and to approach the task before them without undue anxiety.  But
the more recent explosion of Aparenting classes@ and Aparenting manuals@ may induce parents to
view their children as alarmingly fragile laboratory specimens that must be cosseted and
indulged lest the parents receive a failing grade.  Or it can encourage parental narcissism and
self-congratulation.73  Sometimes this narcissism is relatively benign, as when parents bestow
on their children quirky first names calling attention to the parents= cleverness and individuality.
But sometimes it can encourage parents to view their children not as distinct individuals in their
own right but rather as flauntable manifestations of their parental skills, leading them to treat the
children as means rather than as ends by overloading the children with structure,
accomplishments, and anxiety.
Overparented children typically face not just a heavy academic schedule but also a strenuous
program of extracurricular activities B tennis lessons, Mandarin classes, ballet.
After-school activities are thought to impress college admissions officers. . . . When
summer comes, the child is often sent to a special-skills camp.  Extracurricular activities
and camps are areas where competition between parents, thought to be a major culprit in
this whole business, is likely to surface.  How do you explain to the other mother that
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while her child spent the summer examining mollusks at marine-biology camp, yours was
at a regular old camp, stringing beads and eating s=mores?74
d.  [S]ensual vs. [S]ense
In lines 5 through 9, the speaker suggests that sins of the mind are more blameworthy than sins
of the flesh:  that transgressors impelled by intellect are more culpable than those impelled by
emotion.  This hierarchy of blame finds obvious confirmation in our criminal law, which treats
one who kills intentionally in cold blood more harshly than one who kills intentionally in the
heat of passion.75  Of course, the mere fact that a heat of passion precipitated the homicide
cannot be allowed to mitigate the offense; otherwise, those with less self-control would be
rewarded with greater access to the shelter of this legal mitigation.  For an intentional killer to be
charged only with manslaughter rather than with murder, more is required than mere heat of
passion; the passion must have resulted from Aadequate provocation.@76
The inquiry as to the adequacy of a putative provocation is not a blame-the-victim inquiry.  That
is, a finding that the provocation is adequate does not imply that the victim is somehow to blame
for his own death.  The notion, rather, is that the killer=s loss of self-control resulting from the
provocation is not an entirely unexpected loss of self-control.  Provocation is considered
adequate if it Amight render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly or
without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judgment.@77  One might say
that the provocation must have diminished the killer=s capacity, albeit only partially and only
temporarily.  Professor Dressler puts the matter this way:
[The mitigative principle of] provocation . . . is based to a considerable extent on the law=s
concession to ordinary human frailty; the ultimate question, therefore, is whether
we (or the jury) consider the provoked party=s anger within the range of expected
human responses to the provocative situation.  Put somewhat differently, we must
decide if the provocative even might cause an ordinary person B one of ordinary
and neither short nor saintly temperament B to become enraged or emotionally
overcome.78
The kind of offense mitigated by this rule is an offense of emotion:  Ato become enraged or
emotionally overcome.@  But if the expectedness of a loss of self-control is the rationale for this
mitigative rule, why is emotion the only expected response that can justify mitigation?  Cannot
intellectualizing B even premeditating79 B likewise lie beyond the control of the intellectualizer?
The speaker in Sonnet 35 asserts that his conflicted emotional state Aprovoked@ his
intellectualizing on behalf of his beloved B his authorizing and his bringing in sense B  to such an
extent that such intellectualizing lay beyond his powers of self-control:  (I . . . needs must [line
13]).  And the Freudians surely teach us that seemingly unemotional mental processes can in fact
be driven by feelings of anger or shame which, though only subconsciously experienced, are no
less powerful in undermining self-control than the manifest rage felt by, say, a husband upon
discovering his wife in the act of adultery.80  After Freud, can we justifiably distinguish between
thinking and feeling?  Even John Milton, writing more than 300 years ago, understood that :
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.81
And as the speaker in Sonnet 35 troubles to remind us, sensual and sense share the same root.
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e.  I bring in sense . . . =gainst myself
The speaker asserts that to use one=s intellect on behalf of an advers[ary] is corrupting.  When
an attorney undertakes to represent in court a client whose views or actions she detests,82 is she
not, in a sense, acting =gainst [her]self?  And if so, is she corrupt[ed] in the process?  An
attorney might choose to represent a detested client out of a sense of loyalty to the adversary
system or as an intellectual challenge.  But at what cost to the attorney herself?  To succeed in
such representation, the attorney must compartmentalize her life and detach herself from her own
feelings.  Having thus detached herself, she may be unable to reconnect with her feelings in
domestic or romantic relationships that demand emotional connection.  She may be wary and
adroit where she would be better served by being open and guileless.  AWhy Lawyers Lose in
Love@ is the telling headline for an article in the American Bar Association Journal describing
the particular troubles that attorneys may engender when they bring their lawyering skills into
the home.83
II.  Sonnet 138
This poem is one of the so-called Dark Lady sonnets:  a sequence of sonnets about the speaker=s
mistress,84 who, contrary to the standards of beauty prevailing in Shakespeare=s England, has
black hair and black eyes.85
1When my love swears that she is made of truth,
2I do believe her though I know she lies,
3That she might think me some untutored youth,
4Unlearnèd in the world=s false subtleties.
5Thus vainly thinking that she thinks me young,
6Although she knows my days are past the best,
7Simply I credit her false-speaking tongue:
8On both sides thus is simple truth suppressed.
9But wherefore says she not she is unjust?
10And wherefore say not I that I am old?
11O love=s best habit is in seeming trust,
12And age in love loves not to have years told.
13 Therefore I lie with her, and she with me,
14 And in our faults by lies we flattered be.
While the speaker in Sonnet 35 was directly addressing his beloved, the speaker in this sonnet is
speaking about his beloved; the addressee is seemingly the reader or the speaker himself.  And
while Sonnet 35 begins with direct discourse B words actually uttered (or recalled as having been
uttered) B this sonnet begins with indirect discourse.  That is, line 1 does not tell us that the
mistress actually uttered the words AI am made of truth.@  Rather, the speaker simply reports that
the mistress said in substance that she was made of truth, but he withholds from us the mistress=s
actual words.  Indeed, the whole sonnet is, in this manner, indirect.  Whereas second-person
pronouns dominate Sonnet 35 (thou and thy appear in it a total of eight times), this sonnet is
dominated by third-person pronouns (she and her appear a total of eleven times).  Also, the tone
of this sonnet is very different.  While Sonnet 35 is grim and accusatory, this sonnet is ironic and
tolerant.
In another respect, however, this sonnet is similar to Sonnet 35.  Both sonnets begin by referring
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to past acts.  The first line of Sonnet 35 suggests (with its no more) that the beloved had grieved
over his previous conduct toward the speaker.  The first line of Sonnet 138 suggests, inasmuch as
one does not ordinarily protest that one is faithful unless one=s fidelity has been questioned, that
the speaker had previously accused his mistress of infidelity.  In this case, the mistress=s response
to the accusation was to declare that she was made of truth:  Atruth@ in the sense of sexual
fidelity.86  But made of truth is such an extravagant claim B no one is made of truth; no one is
entirely honest B that one cannot help suspecting that she protests too much and is in fact guilty
as charged.  We must remember, though, that these words are the speaker=s rendering.  Perhaps
the mistress=s actual words were more believable but the speaker, who know[s] she lies (line 2),
recasts the actual words into a seemingly dishonest form.
In line 2, the speaker seems to contradict himself.  He says that he believes his mistress=s
protestations and then says that he knows she is lying.  How can that be?  One might read this
line simply as a pleasing paradox, since one certainly can believe and disbelieve at the same
time.87  But the quatrain as a whole suggests a different reading.  When the speaker says I . . .
believe her, what he means is that he pretends to believe her and acts as though he believes her,
and in lines 3 and 4 he explains why he pretends:  He wants his mistress to think him younger
than he really is, lest he lose her love (or at least her sexual accessibility), so he tries to exhibit
the naivté and credulousness of an untutored youth.  Oddly, however, the speaker, in describing
the impression he wishes to create, avoids the expected direct adjectives B Anaive@ or Aignorant@,
for example B and instead makes his point indirectly by relying on negative adjectives:  
untutored and unlearnèd.88  This choice enables the speaker B in a way that Anaive@ and A
ignorant@ do not B to voice and thereby admit to the very qualities he possesses but wishes to
conceal from his mistress:  Atutored@ and Alearnèd@.
Reading the first quatrain, we may well wonder whether the mistress is taken in by the speaker=s
dissimulation.  The second quatrain tells us that she is not taken in and, indeed, that she engages
in some dissimulation of her own.  The speaker would like to believe that his deception succeeds
and that the mistress truly thinks [him] young (line 5), but the speaker admits, by inserting the
word vainly (in the sense of Afutilely@), that he knows in his heart that the deception does not
succeed.89  And in line 6 he comes right out and says she knows that he is old.  Well actually, he
does not come right out and say Aold@ (not yet, anyway); he says instead my days are past the
best.  This arch phrase is a litotes:  a rhetorical device whereby an affirmative is expressed by
negating its opposite.90  We say Anot bad@ to indicate Arather good.@  When Eleanor Roosevelt,
addressing the 1940 Democratic Presidential Convention, declared, AThis is no ordinary time,@ 
she was admonishing the delegates to recognize how extraordinary the time was.91  And
Shakespeare himself seems to have coined the litotes Aseen better days@.92  Thus, while the
sonnet=s speaker attributes to his mistress the language of overstatement (made of truth), the
speaker himself relies on a mischievous kind of understatement to describe his own
circumstances,93 perhaps flattering himself that he is more self-aware than she.
Line 7 begins with the adverb [s]imply, which euphoniously echoes the adverb vainly in line 5.
But while the adverb (meaning Afutilely@) in line 5 describes the speaker=s attempt to fool
himself, the adverb (meaning Ain pretended simplicity@) in line 7 describes the speaker=s attempt
to fool the mistress:  the same attempt to which the previous quatrain is devoted.  Indeed, line 7
substantially repeats the remark made in line 2 B AI pretend to believe her even though I know
she is lying@ B but with a critical difference.  In line 7, the speaker does not use the verb believe;
he uses the verb credit.  That word has undeniable associations with business transactions:  e.g.,
to extend credit (noun) to a would-be purchaser, or to credit (verb) a customer=s account for
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returned merchandise.  And the next line reinforces the association with commerce by the rather
unexpected phrase both sides.  What makes the phrase unexpected is that the word sides usually
implies the existence of a bargain or a contest, yet here it refers to the speaker and his mistress.
The speaker thus likens his and his mistress=s mutual amorous relations to mutual contractual
relations.  He pretends to believe the mistress=s lies (about her fidelity) in exchange for her
pretending to believe his lies (about his age).  Neither side is fooled by these lies, and the word 
suppressed emphasizes that the lovers= disregard of the truth reflects an act of will, not passive
inattention.94
The adjective simple in line 8 appears to echo the adverb [s]imply in line 7, but this verbal
metamorphosis represents a change in connotation.  The adverb in line 7 means Ain pretended
simplicity@ B i.e., Aas a simpleton might@ B while the adjective in line 8 has the same adjectival
meaning that we would give it today:  uncomplicated, unmistakable.  Thus, in line 8 the speaker
uses simpl[icity] as a term of praise and in line 7 as a term of disparagement, illustrating perhaps
the porousness of the boundary between admirable qualities and unappealing ones.95
In lines 9 and 10 we reach the climax of the sonnet.  With two simple questions, and with the
blunt adjective old replacing the evasive phrase past the best, the speaker confronts the two
mutual pretenses and asks why.  AWhy doesn=t she just admit to me that she=s unfaithful [line 9]?
Why don=t I just acknowledge to her that I=m old [line 10]?@  But the speaker already knows the
answers to his two questions, and he supplies them.  AThe reason she doesn=t admit to me that she
=s unfaithful is that love=s best habit is in seeming trust:  she knows that love is more likely to
flourish when the parties at least act as though they trust each other.96  And the reason I don=t
admit to her that I am old is that age in love loves not to have years told:  older lovers fear that
emphasizing their true age will cost them their continued sexual access.@
The most distinctive feature of line 12 is the playful word-pair love loves.  I have already noted
Shakespeare=s device of using the same word twice in the same sentence:  once in its normal part
of speech and once in an unconventional part of speech.97  In line 12, however, both uses of the
word love B as noun and as verb B are quite conventional.  But by putting conventional noun and
conventional verb together, the speaker emphasizes the variability of the word and, by extension,
the variability of love itself.  Indeed, love appears four times in this sonnet, each time with a
different meaning, as if to suggest that love itself may take many forms, including a relationship
based on mutual pretense such as that described and experienced by the speaker.98  And in line
12, the speaker once again uses a deflective litotes (loves not instead of Ahates@) when referring
to himself, just as he did in lines 3, 4, and 6.
This third quatrain asks two questions and provides two answers, yet each answer is separated
from the question to which it responds.  A more natural organization would have placed each
answer immediately following its question:
9First question [But wherefore says she not . . . ]
10Answer to first question [O love=s best habit . . . ]
11Second question [And wherefore say not I . . . ]
12Answer to second question [And age in love . . . ]
Why does the speaker follow an Aunnatural@ organization here, putting the two questions together
at the beginning and then putting the two answers together at the end?  The unlikely line-order
sets a trap for his readers:  a trap that emphasizes the speaker=s untroubled acquiescence in the
counterfeit status quo.  By the time we reach the third quatrain, the speaker has already described
his relationship as one of mutual pretense.  Consequently, when we first read the two questions
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together, we are inclined to suppose them rhetorical and expect them to be followed by a
renunciation of pretense on both sides and a call for greater honesty:  AWhy do we tell each other
these obvious lies?  Why don=t we just admit the truth and continue our relationship on a more
honest footing?@  But, surprise!  The speaker does not reject mutual deception; he embraces it.
He disappoints our expectations by treating the two questions not as rhetorical but as genuine
interrogatories and then answering each of them with an unapologetic call for further deception.
Had the quatrain been organized in the more logical question/answer/question/answer format
instead of the question/question/answer/answer format, we should have had no time to fall into
the trap the speaker laid for us, and we therefore might not have observed the remarkable
equanimity with which the speaker accepts this contractual mutual pretense.99
The couplet resolves the sonnet=s action by summarizing the provisions of the couple=s bargain
and B with a lighthearted sexual pun on the word lie B specifying the nature of the prize derived
from the bargain.  But lie is not the only pun to be found in the couplet.  [F]aults in line 14 is an
almost perfect homonym for false,100 the adjective the speaker uses in line 4 to describe the
world=s subtleties:  what we call in cliché language Athe way of the world.@  The couple, at the
last, has fashioned a bargain based on the very subtleties in which the speaker affected to be 
unlearnèd.  And after 13 lines in which all the pronouns were singular, the speaker finally notes
in line 14 the mutuality of the pretense by using the plural pronouns our and we.101
a.  Legalese
Taken as a whole, Sonnet 138 is much easier to understand than Sonnet 35.  The earlier sonnet
(sequenced earlier; not necessarily written earlier) relies almost entirely on metaphors for its
action; the later sonnet uses no metaphors at all.102  And the later sonnet is largely
monosyllabic; though both sonnets contain the same number of syllables (140), the later sonnet
contains 101 monosyllabic words, while the earlier sonnet contains only 82.  The speaker of the
later sonnet conspicuously avoids A[t]affeta phrases, silken terms . . . , / Three-piled hyperboles,
spruce affectation,@103 and instead confines himself to Arusset [homespun] yeas and honest
kersey [plain] noes.@104  Yet this self-consciously ordinary language is used to describe a
contract!  When lawyers draft contracts (or statutes or regulations), we tend to employ a complex
writing-style known disparagingly as legalese.  A critic of legalese might therefore say, AIf
Shakespeare can express contractual terms simply, why can=t you lawyers?@  So I should like to
take this opportunity to say a few words in defense of legalese.
Every profession has its jargon, and lawyers= jargon is more benign than most.  Physicians talk
about Acontusions@ when they could easily say Abruises.@  I have heard interior architects speak of
a Atask light@ when they meant nothing more remarkable than a Adesk lamp.@  And government
officials say Ainappropriate@ when they want to avoid saying what their objection is.  But lawyers
= jargon is designed for exactitude and concision.  Common synonyms do not exist for legal
terms like Aper stirpes@ or Aconsideration@ or Aimpleader@, and accordingly these terms of art
cannot be replaced except by paragraph-long explications that would make legal texts cluttered
and infelicitous.
But it is not lawyers= vocabulary that draws the laity=s ire so much as it is our sentence-structure.  
ANeedlessly complicated@ is a common complaint.  AObfuscation@ is a common description,
suggesting that lawyers deliberately choose language that masks their true intentions.  But
though the late H.W. Fowler, in his magisterial Modern English Usage,105 speaks disparagingly
of what he calls Aofficalese@106 and Asociologese@107, he has some very kind B and indeed apt B 
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things to say about legalese.  After quoting a lengthy example of legalese, he writes,
This is certainly not pretty or luminous writing.  But it is not officialese, nor is it
circumlocution.  It is legalese, and the reason why it is difficult to grasp is not that
it wanders verbosely round the point but that it goes straight there with a baffling
economy of words.  It has the compactness of a mathematical formula.  Legalese
cannot be judged by literary standards.  In it everything must be subordinated to
one paramount purpose:  that of ensuring that if words have to be interpreted by a
Court[,] they will be given the meaning the draftsman intended.108
To illustrate Fowler=s point about the peculiar attributes of good legalese, I present the case of
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.109  (Inasmuch as different States have adopted their own
versions of the Uniform Act, I shall use the Illinois version.)  Suppose Smith executes a will that
provides in part, AI devise Blackacre to A; but if A should predecease me, then to B.@  Suppose
further that Smith and A die in the same automobile accident, and we cannot determine whether 
A did or did not predecease Smith.  The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, as adopted in Illinois,
provides the following default rule (in the absence of a testamentary provision dealing with this
survivorship problem):
If the title to property or its devolution depends upon priority of death and there is no
sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously[, . . .
t]he property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived.110
To critics of legalese, the italicized words look like the perfect example of  legalistic
obfuscation.  One can almost hear the cry, AWhy not simply say >if the persons died
simultaneously=?@  In fact, however, the statutory language does exactly what it is supposed to
do.  If the language were changed as proposed by these hypothetical critics, the statutory solution
would be available only if one could prove that the persons actually did die simultaneously.  And
how often would one be able to prove that?  The problem at which the statute is aimed is a
problem that arises not only when the persons actually die simultaneously but also whenever one
cannot prove that the deaths were not simultaneous:  that is, when one cannot determine who
died first.  The existing statutory language does reach this broader range of circumstances.111
b.  [T]ruth suppressed:  Litotes and Euphemisms
When the speaker in Sonnet 138 says Amy days are past the best@ instead of AI am old,@ we do not
squirm with discomfort at this evasion; we chuckle with appreciative recognition.  But when a
government official declares AI was less than candid@ instead of AI lied,@ we sense that the time
for squirming has come.
Euphemisms may have begun as a way to ward off evil spirits.  The Furies (in Greek, Erinnyes (
ED4<L,H)) were three sister-goddesses of vengeance Awho punished by their secret stings the
crimes of those who escaped or defied public justice.@112  So terrifying were they to contemplate
113
 B or even to mention by name B that the Greeks customarily referred to them as the AKindly
Ones@ (in Greek, Eumenides (+L:,<4*,H)), lest referring to them directly have the effect of
summoning them.114  Even today, we sometimes consciously avoid the straightforward naming
of things that frighten us:  e.g., referring to cancer as Athe Big C.@115  And estate planners
frequently hear clients refer obliquely to their eventual deaths by means of the phrase Aif
something should happen to me,@ as if the event for which attorney and client are planning is
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only a possibility, merely one of any number of transitory interruptions that might or might not
occur in the future.  This habit of mind in clients requires a good deal of sensitivity on the part of
an estate planning attorney.  On the one hand, she wants to avoid sending her clients into a
morbid panic through excessive bluntness, since few of us (including, presumably, the attorney)
can contemplate our own deaths dispassionately.  On the other hand, she must be sure that her
clients understand that they are planning for something that will occur, not for something that
simply may occur.  Besides, clients may actually welcome an opportunity to talk about their fears
of death, including fears of leaving their minor children abandoned and uncared-for, so the
attorney should not signal to her clients any reluctance to engage in such a discussion.116
Euphemisms like Athe Kindly Ones@ or Athe Big C@ are relatively harmless.  They make life
pleasanter, and no one is fooled.  But some euphemisms do a great deal of harm; they
camouflage reprehensible conduct and shield it from penalty.  Few euphemisms are as atrocious
as Athe Final Solution to the Jewish Question@ (Adie Endlösung der Judenfrage@) to refer to the
Nazis= systematic extermination of European Jews.  One would have supposed that the horror of
those events and the retrospective ghastliness of the perpetrators= coded language would have so
sickened us of political euphemisms that we would never again employ them.  Yet today we
refer to the unplanned wartime killing of civilians and destruction of their homes as Acollateral
damage,@ as if such occasions were not tragedies but simply normal wear and tear.  We apply the
phrase Aextraordinary rendition@ to the secret transfer of captured suspects to the jurisdiction of a
foreign country expected to torture them.117  And, albeit on a less heinous level, the executives
of pharmaceutical manufacturers apply the innocuous term Apublication planning@ to their
practice of planting in medical journals ghostwritten articles that are ostensibly disinterested but
in fact calculated to promote the manufacturers= products.118  Not only does this kind of
linguistic disguise impede the enforcement of laws and norms, it also facilitates their violation by
shielding perpetrators from a sense of their own culpability, and it brutalizes the rest of us by
shielding us from a sense of our own complicity.
The euphemisms discussed so far are associated more with the political Right than with the
political Left.  But the Left has embraced another category of euphemisms, which has come to be
known as Political Correctness.  I suppose the impulse to call persons confined to a wheelchair A
mobility-impaired@ or Adifferently-abled@ rather than Ahandicapped@ or Acrippled@ seems
superficially like the impulse to call aerial bombardment Aair support@, but in fact very different
strategies are at work.  The impulse behind the latter is camouflage and concealment.  The
impulse behind the politically correct euphemisms, on the other hand, is community-building:
an anti-hegemonic reluctance to categorize any status as substandard and a communitarian desire
to remove the implicit label of Aother@ from as many people as possible.  Unfortunately, these
politically correct euphemisms are sometimes brandished with such belligerent
self-righteousness, and they are often so clumsy and ill-fitting, that they bring discredit upon
impulses that ought to be commendable.
For example, one rarely hears any more the term Aslum@ or Aghetto@ applied to an economically
and socially blighted urban American neighborhood; we hear Ainner city@, even though many
expensive white urban neighborhoods are geographically situated far more centrally than some
poor Latino or Black neighborhoods.  Similarly, while the old phrase Aillegal alien@ calls forth all
sorts of unnecessarily disagreeable associations (felons from Mars!), the politically correct term A
undocumented worker@, in addition to sounding clinical and pompous, is both under- and
over-inclusive.  It is under-inclusive in that some noncitizens who entered this country without
complying with our immigration laws have no intention of entering the labor force; that is, they
are not A workers,@ even though they fall into the group to which the term Aundocumented worker
@ is regularly applied.  And the term is over-inclusive in that many native-born citizens who are
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undeniably working lack documents like a passport, an available birth certificate, or even a
Social Security number.119
Sometimes the imprecision of politically correct neologisms can be comical.  Consider this scene
from a play in which a white Dean of Students (who had previously been an administrator at a
historically Black college called Lancaster College) has a conversation with the white President
of a mostly-white college that has recently hired the Dean:  a conversation in which the President
struggles absurdly to avoid uttering the blunt but obviously applicable word ABlack.@
Kenney [the president].  (speaking about the dean to a third party)  She=s our liaison to
the minority students.
. . .
Sarah [the dean of students].  [W]hat was that about my being a liaison to the minority
students[?]
Kenney.  Oh well, because of the Lancaster thing.
Sarah.  Pardon?
Kenney.  Well, you know we consciously set out to diversify, and we really wanted your
experience, coming from Lancaster.  Serving a more [pause] diverse student population.
Sarah.  It wasn=t really diverse.
Kenney.  Then a minority population.
Sarah.  I was in the minority.
Kenney.  Then an African-American population.  Is that what you wanted me to say?120
However well-intentioned President Kenney may have been, her reluctance to utter the word A
Black@ or AAfrican-American@ betrays a patronizing and even stigmatizing anxiety, as if she
thought Blackness too mortifying a quality to be mentioned directly.
And sometimes politically correct neologisms can have a harmful effect on policy.
Schoolchildren who have exceptional difficulty grasping the standard curriculum used to be
described as Amentally retarded.@  Now, more often, we hear the phrase Aspecial needs@.121  It is
true that schoolchildren of less than average intelligence require special attention from teachers
and administrators if they are to achieve and flourish.  But the same can B and should B be said of
schoolchildren of exceptionally high intelligence, who, without special attention, are denied the
opportunity of realizing their full intellectual potential:
[A]cademically gifted students . . . need educational services not usually . . . provided in
regular classrooms.  These students are not just learning machines, rapidly
acquiring knowledge and skills (although they do that).  Their reasoning and
insight are like those of older students; they are capable of making distant
connections and corralling multiple resources in their problem solving; most are
passionately curious; many are highly creative when given permission to Athink
outside the box.@  At the same time, . . . they are socially, emotionally, and
academically vulnerable to chronically underchallenging educational settings.
They are especially vulnerable in the everyday company of age peers from whom
they experience pressure to conform, but among whom they find few to none with
whom they can communicate their thoughts and insights. . . .  Their loss is a loss
not only to them, but a loss of their future leadership of the very society that has
been so blatantly unable to solve its social problems.122
As long as Aspecial needs@ is used as code for Amentally or developmentally disabled@, rather
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than as shorthand for Arequiring exceptional educational services@, Americans will continue to
overlook the problems that exceptionally gifted students face and will continue to lose much of
the benefit that those students might confer on our society.
All right, then.  Politically correct euphemisms are asinine.  And clumsy and pompous and
priggish and self-congratulatory.  But would it really be a better world if instead we felt free to
apply words like Aslum@ or Aretarded@?  To me, it=s a question of courtesy.  Good manners may
seem today to be an insubstantial doctrine to preach, but it is one that I commend to my readers= 
attention.  In his poem AA Prayer for My Daughter@, William Butler Yeats chose Acourtesy@ as
the quality in which he=d Ahave her chiefly learned.@123
c.  Telling [L]ies to Gain Sexual Access
The speaker and his mistress in Sonnet 138 tell each other lies in order to maintain untroubled
sexual relations.  Their lies are mutual, of course, and neither of them is in fact deceived, but this
pattern of behavior has broader implications.  Suppose only one party is lying and the other party
is deceived.  Obtaining property by false pretenses is an actionable tort124 (as well as a crime
125), but what about obtaining sexual acquiescence by false pretenses?
Acquiring property from another is neither criminal nor actionable if the property was obtained
with the transferor=s consent.  We treat acquisition by fraud as both criminal and actionable in
part because the transferee=s misconduct, in inducing the victim to relinquish something of value,
undermines any claim by the transferee that the transferor consented to part with it.  As a matter
of abstract legal doctrine, therefore, Againing sexual cooperation by fraud is as culpable as other
forms of deceptive appropriation that are already (and uncontroversially) unlawful.@126  As a
practical matter, however, Aa man may [legally] do things to get a woman=s agreement to sex that
would be illegal were he to take her money in the same way.@127  This gap between doctrine and
practice may reflect a suspicion that sexual access is not Asomething of value@:  that in an age
when a lack of virginity hardly impairs a woman=s marital prospects128 and when in any event
an unmarried woman can thrive financially, acquiescing in sex because of fraudulent
misrepresentations does not produce a compensable harm129 but rather is Amerely humiliating.@
130
Of course, to argue that sexual fraud is noncompensable because its results are Amerely
humiliating@ is an argument that proves too much, since damages for the tort of intentional
infliction of mental distress have in fact been awarded based on conduct that Amerely@ produced
humiliation.131  But in those cases where damages were in fact awarded, the defendant=s
conduct was found to be outrageous in some way.132  Mental distress induced by
non-outrageous conduct generally has been found not to be actionable.133  Our instinctive
uneasiness with awarding damages for seduction by fraud may reflect a belief that lying to get
sex is not outrageous behavior but actually commonplace behavior:  A[E]verything in romance is
lying and delusion[,] and . . . judgment goes out the window in sexual matters.@134  By this
formulation, someone who is provisionally available for sex expects to be lied to or, at least,
willingly suspends her disbelief;135 and therefore the seducer acts reasonably in expecting no
reliance on his lies by the seduced.  Except in the most extreme cases Ano clear social consensus
[exists] about the circumstances in which misrepresentation in matters of sexual intimacy is
improper.@136
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Professor Larson=s article on this subject, which I have quoted earlier, is titled in part AA 
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction.@137  The model she uses to present her argument presupposes
that it is the male who is the deceiver and the female who is the deceived.  Popular culture
certainly confirms such a model:  the woman naive and credulous; the man nimble and
calculating.  Indeed, popular culture goes further and commends to women the Avirtues@ of naivté
and ignorance as a way of demonstrating a becoming femininity.138  Ironically, the speaker in
Sonnet 138 inverts this common prejudice; it is he B not the woman B who pretends to
credulousness as a way of maintaining his sexual desirability to the other.
d.  On both sides:  Paying for Sexual Access
The speaker in this sonnet uses the language of commerce to describe a sexual relationship.  Yet
we feel instinctively that sexual access is not a fit subject for contractual arrangements.  Is this
instinct sound or merely sentimental?
Prostitution is the classic example of the intersection between sex and commerce.139  Despite
the example set by the male speaker in Sonnet 138, the question whether to legalize prostitution,
like the question whether to treat seduction as an actionable tort, is almost invariably considered
in a gendered context with women, not men, acting as the sellers of sexual access.  Indeed, so
deeply ingrained is the assumption that prostitutes are female that some commentators who
mention male prostitution betray their surprise and discomfiture by using the phrase Amale
prostitution@ even when the context makes the prostitute=s male gender clear, as if to suggest that
male prostitution is so aberrant that its existence cannot be merely alluded to but must rather be
accentuated.140  Nonetheless, because gender roles underlie so many of the arguments
historically presented both on behalf of and in opposition to prostitution,141 I shall confine my
discussion to the case of female prostitutes serving male clients.
The objections to prostitution begin with the assertion that exchanging sex for money is
immoral:  an assertion that provokes two responses.  First, many things are agreed to be immoral 
B lying and adultery, for instance B yet are also agreed not to be fit subjects for the criminal law,
except in the most unusual cases (such as lying under oath in court).  Second, in many contexts,
the exchange of sex for money is not considered immoral.  In a medical context, the provision of
sexual services by a sexual surrogate, for money, seems not to be the sort of act contemplated by
laws prohibiting prostitution.  And in a marital context, the interspousal exchange of sex for
money is not illegal.142  Thus, the moral foundation of anti-prostitution laws is more likely to be
a sense that the exchange of sex for money (outside of the privileged marital context) degrades
society and those who engage in it, just as laws against cruelty to animals are justified as a means
to prevent the brutalization of the perpetrators rather than as a means to make life pleasanter for
animals.143  Indeed, West Virginia, for one, places its Acruelty to animals@ statute in the same
article (Article 8 of Chapter 61) as its prostitution statute; the article is titled ACrimes against
Chastity, Morality and Decency.@144
What is the nature of the degradation thought to be associated with prostitution:  the degradation
that justifies criminalizing it?  No doubt, physical intimidation and violence play an enormous
role in the lives of many prostitutes,145 but the more logical response to that situation is to
enforce more rigorously the existing criminal laws prohibiting physical intimidation and
violence;146 and the victimized prostitute is more likely to aid in such enforcement (or to seek
its benefits) if she can do so as someone accounted a law-abiding citizen.147  Another locus of
the degradation traced to prostitution is the prostitute=s mental health, which necessarily suffers
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when she must regularly detach her mind from her body in order to perform sexual acts without
personal affect.148  But we have seen that lawyers, too, must sometimes detach themselves from
their own feelings in order to give effective representation to a repugnant client.149  The
exceptionally high suicide rate and incidence of depression among lawyers suggest that they pay
a high psychic price for following their particular vocation,150 yet I am aware of no
seriously-intended calls for the abolition or criminalization of their profession.
Other critics of prostitution argue that it institutionalizes the subordination of women as a class
and, indeed, constitutes part of a Acontinuum of violence@ against women:  from sexual
harassment to domestic abuse to rape.151  Such an analysis of prostitution requires a rethinking
of the concept of Aconsent.@  In Sonnet 138, both the speaker and the mistress enter into the
bargain as equals and with their eyes open.  Proponents of the decriminalization of prostitution
likewise view prostitution as a transaction freely entered into, and it is certainly true that A
[p]rostitution is one of [the few] unskilled jobs where women on average earn more than men.@
152
  But this last group of critics of prostitution responds by arguing that the characterization A
freely entered into@ ignores the realities of women=s experience:  their lack of choice and their
economic and physical vulnerability.153  By this view, prostitutes are their customers= victims,
not their commercial associates B one critic uses the provocative description Abuying the right to
rape@154 B and accordingly such critics argue for the discontinuation of criminal penalties
against the prostitute but continued criminal penalties against the customer.155
e.  [T]hough I know she lies:  Summoning a Liar as a Witness
The speaker know[s] [line 2] his mistress is lying about her constancy, and she knows [line 6] he
is older than he pretends to be, yet each deliberately acts as if he trusted the other=s truthfulness.
The prospect of winking at obvious dishonesty raises particularly intense ethical problems for the
trial lawyer.  Suppose a criminal defendant wishes to testify in his own defense, and his lawyer
suspects that the defendant will perjure himself if called.  May the lawyer, consistently with the
rules of professional conduct, allow her client to testify?  The American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct state:
If a lawyer, the lawyer=s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in
a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.156
This rule distinguishes between a lawyer=s actual knowledge of testimonial falsity (to which the
speaker and his mistress admit) and a mere reasonable belief that the testimony is false.  If the
lawyer has actual knowledge that a witness=s statement is false, the lawyer must take steps to
protect the court from the deception.  But if she merely has a reasonable belief that the witness=s
statement is false, she is not required so to inform the court.  This distinction relieves the lawyer
of the burden of being a trier-of-fact; it gives the lawyer leeway to present evidence helpful to
her client B however suspect such evidence might be B and leave it to the jury to decide whether
to believe it.  If instead the rule barred a lawyer from introducing evidence of whose veracity she
was suspicious, clients would be well-advised to choose the most credulous lawyer they could
find, so as to give her the maximum flexibility in introducing evidence on their behalf; and a
legal system that puts a premium on gullibility is not the sort of system I would trust.
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The first sentence of the quoted rule states that the lawyer must refuse to introduce evidence that
she knows is false; but the language of the rule as a whole indicates that the lawyer need not
refuse to introduce evidence merely because she has a reasonable belief in its falsity.  But may 
the lawyer (consistently with the duty of providing diligent representation157) refuse to
introduce evidence in whose falsity she has a reasonable belief?  After all, if the lawyer does
introduce dubious evidence, the jury is not unlikely to share her doubts, in which case the lawyer
is not helping her client and may indeed be injuring her own professional reputation for probity
and reliability.  The second sentence of the quoted rule B presumably for the reasons I have just
stated B explicitly authorizes the lawyer to refuse to introduce the doubtful evidence, unless the
lawyer is defending the client in a criminal matter and the doubtful evidence in question is the
defendant=s own testimony.  In that situation, the lawyer may refuse to allow the client to make
testimonial statements only if the lawyer knows that the statements are false; if she merely has a
reasonable suspicion that the statements are false, she must allow the client to make them.  This
special rule for testimony by criminal defendants seems to reflect the view that a defendant=s
interest in preserving his own liberty (as opposed to a civil litigant=s interest in preserving his
own property) outweighs the lawyer=s interest in preserving her reputation for candor.
III.  Sonnet 121
This complex, almost combative sonnet belongs to the Young Man sequence, but here the
speaker=s usual role has been reversed.  Instead of reproaching the young man for the young man=
s wantonness,158 the speaker in this sonnet is responding to charges of wantonness brought
against himself by the world at large.  The response explores a favorite theme in the Sonnets:  the
disjunction between appearance and reality.
1>Tis better to be vile than vile esteemed,
2When not to be receives reproach of being,
3And the just pleasure lost, which is so deemed
4Not by our feeling but by others= seeing.
5For why should others= false adulterate eyes
6Give salutation to my sportive blood?
7Or on my frailties why are frailer spies,
8Which in their wills count bad what I think good?
9No, I am that I am, and they that level
10At my abuses reckon up their own;
11I may be straight though they themselves be bevel;
12By their rank thoughts my deeds must not be shown
13 Unless this general evil they maintain:
14 All men are bad and in their badness reign.
The sonnet begins with an astonishing declaration of principle:  that it is better to be vile than to
be thought vile by others.  Yet the line=s accents suggest that this paraphrase is inadequate, or at
least incomplete.  My paraphrase accents the word be, but the speaker=s iambic pentameter
accents the word vile.  So after we read the first five words, with the accent on vile, we expect
the line as a whole to take this form:  >Tis better to be vile than to be X, where X describes some
other human quality.  And since few human qualities are worse than vileness, we expect X to be
very bad indeed.  Yet X turns out to be merely Abeing thought vile by others.@  Why is that so
bad?  The speaker goes on to explain.
Lines 2-4 qualify what seemed in Line 1 to be an unqualified statement.  (Indeed, if I were
punctuating this sonnet afresh, I would allow no punctuation at the end of Line 1.)  While Line 1
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draws a distinction between appearance (vile esteemed) and reality (be vile), Line 2 draws what
should be a sharper distinction, between two contradictory realities:  being vile in fact (being)
and not being vile in fact (not to be).  Yet the speaker posits in Line 2 a state of affairs in which
these contradictory realities give rise to an identical response from others, reproach B that is, a
state of affairs in which the world at large unjustly accuses a virtuous person of vileness B and
the conjunction When that begins Line 2 signals the speaker=s belief that it is this injustice that
makes Abeing thought vile@ worse than Abeing vile in fact.@ Undeserved accusations of vileness,
according to Line 3, deprive the virtuous person of the rewards (pleasure) of being virtuous:  an
inner sense of rectitude and the joy of basking in the good opinion of others.  Traditional
morality tells us that virtue is its own reward and that the upright person should not look for any
external praise or admiration.  Jesus warned his listeners against trumpeting their own good
deeds and praying noisily and conspicuously as a way of attracting the admiration of other
people.159  Yet the speaker, contrary to these authorities, asserts that it is legitimate (just) to
expect these rewards and to feel aggrieved when denied them, particularly when (according to
Line 4) one is deprived of these rewards not because one considers oneself unworthy (Not by our
feeling) but only because others think one is unworthy (but by others= seeing).
To understand the special sting of being unjustly thought vile, we need to revisit the word 
pleasure in Line 3.  Vileness has its pleasures (sexual satiety, for instance) no less than virtue.
Why, asks the speaker, should a person deny himself the pleasures of vileness [w]hen [Line 2]
he must endure the same public reprobation that the truly vile must endure?  As long as he must
live with a reputation for vileness anyway, he may as well experience the pleasures of vileness.
This opening polemic leads us to expect a comic or cynical resolution,160 but, as the speaker
shifts from the abstract to the personal in the second quatrain, we discover that he is not amused
but indignant.  The speaker objects to being judged vile by other people=s false adulterate eyes 
[Line 5].  Adulterate here is an adjective, ostensibly meaning polluted or defective and therefore
unable to function correctly, but the word might also mean adulterous161 and therefore
disqualified from criticizing the sexual conduct of others.  The noun being modified by 
adulterate is, significantly, eyes, for this sonnet treats the eye as the organ of moral judgment:
not the mind or the heart, but the eye.162  Indeed, in keeping with the theme of appearance and
reality, the eye plays this critical role throughout the sonnet:  others= seeing instead of Aothers= 
judging@ in Line 4; spies instead of Ajudges@ in Line 7; shown instead of Aconstrued@ in Line 12.
And the speaker=s synonyms for Avirtuous@ and Adissolute@ in Line 11 B straight and bevel 
respectively B convey their meanings by visual associations.
Even the reader=s eye participates in the action of this sonnet.  VILE, the driving word in the
sonnet=s first line, and EVIL, the driving word in the couplet=s first line, are more than just
synonyms.  They are anagrams.163  Shakespeare played with anagrams in other works as well,
notably in Twelfth Night,164 but this anagram pair in the sonnet belongs to a rare, though not
unique, group:  a quartet of 4-letter anagrams.  VILE, EVIL, VEIL, LIVE.165  Consequently, the
absence of VEIL and LIVE in this sonnet is worth noting.166
The first five lines of the sonnet deal in abstractions.  Even the first-person pronoun our in Line
4, being a plural, does not point to anyone in particular.  But in Line 6, with the pronoun my, we
finally learn that the speaker=s anger at the world=s false judgments is brought on not by its false
judgments of people in general but rather by its false judgments of the speaker himself.  From
Line 6 onward, the speaker shifts continually between I/my and they/their in his quest to identify
the fitter judge.  Note the sequence of personal pronouns:
My
Copyright 8 2010 by Jeffrey G. Sherman
 
My
Their
I
I
I
They
My
Their
They
Their
My
They
Their
And unlike Sonnet 138, this sonnet delivers no final resolution into a Awe@; the speaker=s
resistance to the judgments of the world remains undiminished.
The world=s judgment of the speaker consists in its giv[ing] salutation to [his] sportive blood.  
Sportive blood clearly means lascivious behavior.167  But what does the speaker have in mind in
the earlier part of Line 6 when he complains of his traducers= eyes giv[ing] salutation to his
lasciviousness?  That is, when these traducers give salutation to his lasciviousness, what exactly
are they doing?  Again, the image is visual; these traducers are presuming to observe and
recognize in the speaker these qualities of lasciviousness, perhaps giving him a wink of
familiarity that offends the speaker deeply.  Their familiarity outrages him because they are, he
thinks, in no position to judge him; they are even frailer [Line 7] than he168 and therefore even
less fit to distinguish bad from good [Line 8].  How dare they impute to him the very badness of
which they themselves are guilty?  We like to think that we rely on our own moral judgment in
distinguishing bad from good, but the speaker confronts a world peopled by self-appointed
arbiters of morality who make these distinctions as acts of pure will[] [Line 8], based on their
own compromised perception.  And inasmuch as the noun will, in Elizabethan and Jacobean
times, also meant Acarnal desire@,169 the speaker suggests here that his traducers are making
their determinations of badness and goodness by projecting their own licentiousness onto others.
AJudge not, that ye be not judged,@ Jesus warned his listeners on the Mount,170 and he enjoined
those who assembled for the execution of the woman taken in adultery, ALet him that is among
you without sin cast the first stone at her.@171  These two famous passages are often taken
(wrongly) to mean that no one is fit to judge anyone else:  that no human being is competent to
determine that another=s conduct is wrongful.172  That cannot be correct.  We do not require
judges to be wholly without sin in order to sit on the bench or police officers to be wholly
without sin in order to make an arrest.  If no one is fit to condemn any malfeasance or crime,
then nothing is forbidden and we return to a state of nature, where might makes right.  It is true
that we act at our peril when we condemn others, but the peril Jesus warned against is hypocrisy,
not error.  And his most vivid image of the hypocrite, like many of the images in Sonnet 121,
emphasizes the eye.
And why seest thou the mote, that is in the brother=s eye, and perceivest not the beam that
is in thine own eye?  Or how sayest thou to thy brother, suffer me to cast out the
mote out of thine eye, and behold a beam is in thine own eye?  Hypocrite, first
cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out
the mote out of thy brother=s eye.173
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What makes our moral condemnation of others wrongful, says the Bible, is not the harshness or
inaccuracy of our judgments but rather their foundation, if that foundation involves
self-righteously or hypocritically projecting our own frailties [Line 7] onto others.
The speaker=s claim in the sonnet seems less modest, however.  He goes beyond saying to his
accusers, AYou=re just as bad as I am.@  He says, AYou=re worse (frailer).@  And he does question
the accuracy of their judgments:  [they] count bad what I think good.  So whose moral judgment
is more accurate:  the speaker=s or the world=s?  The speaker does not stoop to answer the two
questions he poses in the sonnet; instead he defiantly repudiates them and makes a presumptuous
claim of freedom from others= judgments and of sovereignty over his own conduct:  I am that I
am [Line 9].  What makes the claim presumptuous B indeed, almost shocking B is its deliberate
appropriation of God=s words to Moses.  When Moses receives God=s instructions on Mount
Horeb, Moses fears that the Israelites will demand God=s name when he tells them that God has
sent him, and he asks God how he should answer such a demand.  God replies that Moses should
answer AI am that I am.@174  It is as if God had declared, ADon=t explain me or defend me.  Don=t
offer them my name, lest they call on me familiarly ([g]ive salutation to).  Just tell them I am
that I am.  That is all they need to know.@
The speaker=s assumption of Godhead in line 9 can be characterized in many ways B arrogant,
ugly B but at least it is not hypocritical.  No furtive sinner, he.  Still, his declaration of
self-dominion is so excessive that one cannot help suspecting that he is speaking more in anger
than in reflection.  Indeed, the speaker grows angrier with each quatrain.  In the first, he speaks
in generalizations about the injustice of being inaccurately judged.  In the second, he reveals his
personal anger at being judged by his moral inferiors.  And in the third, he expresses his outrage
at being judged by anyone at all.  I may be straight, he says in Line 11, rather than AI am straight.
@  That is, AI may be upright or I may not be upright, but I am that I am and you shall not judge
me.  By presuming to judge me for my alleged wrongs [abuses], you are merely projecting onto
me your own wrongs and thereby incriminating yourselves [reckon[ing] up [your] own].@
The word level, which ends the first line of this third quatrain, startles the attentive reader with
its extra syllable.  Along with bevel, it forms a feminine rhyme,175 the only such rhyme in this
sonnet,176 and the very singularity of this rhyme device suggests that the speaker=s choice of
these words has special importance for him.177  The speaker uses level as a verb meaning Atake
aim@,178 but the word can have other meanings as well, and in keeping with this poem=s visual
emphases, these other meanings call forth visual images.  It can be an adjective meaning Aflat.@  
It can be a verb meaning Ato flatten@ or Ato make uniform,@ as if the speaker resents the traducers
for attempting to bring him down to their Alevel@ (here it is a noun).
The speaker completes the feminine rhyme with the word bevel in Line 11:  a word that appears
nowhere else in Shakespeare.  While we use the word today as a noun or a verb, the speaker uses
it as an adjective, meaning Aslanting@ or Aat an angle other than 90 degrees,@ and he uses it to
contrast with the adjective straight in the same line.179  Again, the speaker uses these visual
adjectives to denote moral conditions, just as we would today in casual speech:  AI may be 
upright though they themselves be crooked.@180
The speaker ends the third quatrain with a simple restatement of his objection to being judged by
evil-minded others.  Like Line 1, which appears to be an absolute statement but is instead
qualified immediately by the succeeding line beginning with the conjunction When, Line 12 also
appears to be an absolute statement but is qualified immediately by the succeeding couplet
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beginning with the conjunction Unless.181  The speaker says that he will withdraw his
seemingly unqualified objection to being judged by these rank-thinking traducers if they in
return are willing to subscribe to this general assessment:  All men are bad.182  The speaker will
suffer these traducers to judge him vile provided they are willing to admit that everyone is vile.
And why should such an admission make these traducers= disapprobation of the speaker less
objectionable to him?  Because if these traducers admit that they, too, are vile, then they cannot
be guilty of hypocrisy when they accuse him of vileness.183  Jesus did not warn against judging 
per se but only against judging self-righteously or hypocritically; consequently, by admitting
their own vileness these traducers have purged themselves of their disqualification from judging.
184
But there is more to Line 14 than All men are bad.  The whole line is All men are bad and in
their badness reign, and the antecedent of the pronoun their is not altogether clear.  The
antecedent might be (1) [a]ll men, or it might be (2) the traducers (that is, the same persons to
whom the pronoun they in Line 13 refers).  Under the first interpretation, the speaker is willing to
tolerate the traducers= judgments if the traducers admit to two things:  that all men are bad, and
that badness is the power that drives human society.  Under the second interpretation, the speaker
is willing to tolerate the traducers= judgments if the traducers do two things:  they must admit that
all men are bad, and they must openly rejoice in their own badness (again, no furtive sinning
allowed).  This second interpretation organizes the text this way:
Unless this general evil they maintain:  AAll men are bad;@ and unless they rule in their
badness.
The Quarto=s lack of any comma in Line 14 might incline the reader toward the first
interpretation, but I have already warned against basing interpretations on the Quarto=s
punctuation;185 and in fact a number of editors have inserted a comma between bad and and.  I
find the second interpretation more satisfying and compelling.  Since the target of the speaker=s
anger is the traducers= hypocrisy, he is more likely to tolerate their judgments if they
emphatically renounce hypocrisy by openly exulting in their own badness rather than merely
shrugging it off with the impersonal, commonplace observation that everyone is bad.
a.  [S]portive Violence
Today, the word Asports@ (or, in British usage, Asport@) refers to athletic competition, particularly
competition between teams.  But Shakespeare used Asport@ and Asportive@ as a reference to
recreational sex.186  In King Lear, for instance, the Earl of Gloucester, reminiscing about the
conception of his illegitimate son, remarks that he cannot altogether regret having sired him
inasmuch as the mother was pretty and the sex was hot:  A[Y]et was his mother fair; there was
good sport at his making.@187  I would argue that this apparent change in meaning is not a
change at all; the connection between athletic triumphalism and violent or sexual conquest
remains strong and pervasive.  As recently as August of 2008, when three high school students
were charged with homicide or aggravated assault in connection with the beating death of a
Mexican man living in their small Pennsylvania town, the New York newspaper reporting the
events saw fit to mention that all three were members of the high school football team.188  And
a study of sexual assaults at major American universities during the 1990s found that while male
student athletes make up 3.3 percent of the college population, they committed 19 percent of the
sexual assaults:  almost six times the general rate.189
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Some have hypothesized that the high rate of sexual assaults among college athletes stems from
their sense of privilege engendered by the campuswide adulation of their athletic
accomplishments.190  But the rich sons of rich alumni no doubt arrive at college with a sense of
privilege, too, yet I am unaware of any statistical demonstration of their greater likelihood of
committing sexual assaults.  To me, a more likely explanation is to be found in the misogyny and
homophobia in which our athletes are chiefly learned.191
[F]ootball coaches are well known for berating their players with insults:  ALadies,@ A
faggots,@ Apansies.@192
One coach hung a bra in a player=s locker to signify that player wasn=t tough enough.  In
order to inflame aggression or compliance, coaches called players Apussies@ or A
limp wrists@ and told them Ago home and play with your sisters@ or Astart wearing
silk panties.@193
Male coaches send strong messages about women and about the need for men to avoid
being like women when they compare a poor performance by a male athlete to
that of a girl (for example, throwing like a girl).194
Our culture conditions male athletes to think of athletic skill as a uniquely masculine quality.  A
high school basketball coach in Maine directed his players at halftime to put their hands down
their pants to Acheck their manhood@ before returning to the game, telling them that the game A
was about who had the biggest [male genitalia] in town.@195  One hesitates to disagree with a
professional, but I should have thought that small genitalia would be more conducive to fast
maneuvering on the court.  In any event, when the coach was criticized for having made the
remark, he responded by saying, AWe won,@196 implying that he perceived a causal link between
phallic pride and athletic success; moreover, he claimed that such remarks by a coach are A
normal locker room banter from Fort Kent, Maine, to San Diego, California.@197
These athletic coaches are relying on shame as a motivational tool, and the propellant of that
shame is misogyny.  AIn the hierarchical and rigorously competitive society of other boys, one
categorical imperative outranks all the others:  don=t be a girl.@198  And these coaches, by
hurling Afaggot@ in their teams= faces along with Apussy@, recognize that homophobia can be
relied upon to serve a similar function.
The central outrage of [male-male] sex is that a man is reduced to the status of a woman,
which is understood to be degrading. . . . [H]omosexuality is threatening because
it calls into question the distinctive and superior status of being male.199
The link between locker-room attitudes and military attitudes is too evident to require much
substantiation.  Historian Paul Fussell in Wartime, his analysis of the American and British home
fronts during the Second World War, observed that male soldiers in combat Awill attack only if
young, athletic, credulous, and sustained by some equivalent of the buddy system B that is, fear
of shame.@200  And a civilian commission charged with examining a recent spate of sexual
assaults at the United States Air Force Academy concluded that sexual assaults by male cadets
on female cadets were Afrequent and unpunished.@201
The world can be a dangerous and violent place.  I am not entirely unsympathetic to the view
that we cannot afford to let our soldiers be any less aggressive and brutal than our opponents= 
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soldiers,202 but we need to acknowledge the nonpecuniary costs of cultivating that degree of
ferocity.
b.  Unjustly Enjoying the just pleasure:  Why Is Hypocrisy So Harmful?
According to the Gospels, Jesus spoke of a number of sins but none more frequently or more
censoriously than the sin of hypocrisy.203  Abraham Lincoln, in a famous letter to his friend
Joshua Speed, likewise spoke of hypocrisy as a peculiarly detestable offense.
Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid.  As a nation, we began by
declaring that Aall men are created equal.@  We now practically read it Aall men are
created equal, except negroes.@  When the Know-Nothings [a nativist American
political party of the 1850s] get control, it will read Aall men are created equal,
except negroes, and foreigners and catholics.@  When it comes to this[,] I should
prefer emigrating to some country where they made no pretense of loving liberty 
B to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base
alloy of hypocrisy.204
Hypocrisy is more than a mere failure to live up to one=s expressed ideals; we are imperfect
creatures, after all, and do not always practice what we preach.205  Hypocrisy involves Apretense
@, to reiterate Lincoln=s remark, and it goes beyond mere lying.  The hypocrite professes beliefs
that he does not really hold or flaunts a virtue that he ought to know he does not really possess.
206
  If someone asks a drug addict, named A, AAre you a drug addict?@ and A answers Ano,@ A 
may be a liar, but he is not a hypocrite.  But if A has made a public career out of demonizing
drug addicts and calling for their harsh punishment, then A has moved beyond lying and attained
true hypocrisy.
Recent events have showcased some rather notorious examples of hypocrisy.  Rush Limbaugh, a
popular conservative radio and television personality, famously included drug addicts among the
targets of his vitriol and contempt.  In a 1993 broadcast, he said
[S]end the people who want to do drugs to London and Zurich, and let=s be rid of them. . .
. I=m appalled at people who simply want to look at all this abhorrent behavior
and say people are going to do drugs anyway [so] let=s legalize it.  It=s a dumb
idea. . . . 207
And in a 1995 broadcast,
Drug use destroys societies.  Drug use, some might say, is destroying this country.  And
we have laws against selling drugs, pushing drugs, using drugs, importing drugs.
And these laws are good because we know what happens to people in societies
and neighborhoods which become consumed by them.  And so if people are
violating the law by doing drugs, they ought to be accused and they ought to be
convicted and they ought to be sent up [the river to prison].208
The American press later revealed, however, that Mr. Limbaugh had for years (including the
years during which he made the quoted broadcasts) been addicted to prescription painkillers,
consuming them in such high quantities as to suggest to Florida law enforcement officials that he
obtained them illegally.209  Oddly enough, after conceding on his broadcast that the news
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reports of his addiction were true and then flying off to rehab, he made a point of saying, on his
return to broadcasting, AThere is no hypocrisy in this.@210  I disagree, of course; hypocrisy is 
exactly what it was, given his long record of self-righteous excoriation of drug addicts.211  And
his very denial of hypocrisy demonstrates an understanding of how very bad hypocrisy is.  Just
as Lincoln, albeit for rhetorical purposes only, suggested that hypocrisy was worse than racism,
212
 Limbaugh seemed to recognize implicitly, by denying his hypocrisy while admitting his
drug abuse, that hypocrisy is worse than drug addiction.
But why is it worse?  What is it about hypocrisy that makes it an especially grave transgression?
I make two suggestions:  one relating to unsuccessful hypocrisy and the other to successful
hypocrisy.  First, widespread hypocrisy leads us to suspect virtue.  Once discovered (and it
generally is), hypocrisy makes us cynical, and extreme cynicism (a willingness to believe
anything bad) is closely akin to extreme gullibility (a willingness to believe anything good):  a
most undesirable quality for a member of a democratic polity to possess.  Former congressman
Mark Foley (R-Florida) had undertaken a worthy legislative project:  the protection of children
from sexual predation.213  But now that there has come to light his practice of sending frequent
sexual messages to underage male congressional pages whom he supervised,214 future
legislators who undertake to make child-protection a legislative priority can expect to be viewed
with suspicion as persons who protest too much.  Such unreflective cynicism weakens social
incentives to be good, inasmuch as the reward of good actions then becomes suspicion rather
than the just pleasure.
The second harm brought about by hypocrisy involves the successful hypocrite, one who is not
found out.  A person=s success in leading a double life B say, publicly condemning
homosexuality while surreptitiously enjoying frequent homosexual encounters B can induce him
to regard himself as somehow exempt from the struggles and constraints affecting society at
large.215  I would not trust a legislator who exempted himself from his own enactments,
inasmuch as he would have little understanding and no experience Aof how [his] legislation
actually bites.@216  I would not trust a judge who thought herself exempt from her own
pronouncements; one cannot act justly toward others if one fancies oneself superior to those to
whom the normal rules apply.  The successful hypocrite can develop a contempt for the society
he has successfully beguiled and for those of his fellow sinners who lack his skills in
dissimulation or his powers of self-protection.  For a vivid example of this contemptuous
attitude, look to Roy Cohn as fictionally presented in Tony Kushner=s play Angels in America.
When Cohn=s doctor informs him that Cohn has AIDS, Cohn objects ferociously to being
labelled Ahomosexual.@
[L]abels tell you . . . one thing only:  where does an individual so identified fit in the food
chain, in the pecking order?  Not ideology, or sexual taste, but something much
simpler:  clout.  Not who I fuck or who fucks me, but who will pick up the phone
when I call, who owes me favors.  This is what a label refers to.  Now to someone
who does not understand this, homosexual is what I am because I have sex with
men.  But really this is wrong.  Homosexuals are not men who sleep with other
men.  Homosexuals are men who in fifteen years of trying cannot get a pissant
antidiscrimination bill through City Council.  Homosexuals are men who know
nobody and who nobody knows.  Who have zero clout.  Does this sound like me .
. . ? . . . This is not sophistry.  And this is not hypocrisy.  This is reality.  I have
sex with men.  But unlike nearly every other man of whom this is true, I bring the
guy I=m screwing to the White House and President Reagan smiles at us and
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shakes his hand.  Because what I am is defined entirely by who I am.  Roy Cohn
is not a homosexual.  Roy Cohn is a heterosexual man . . . who fucks around with
guys.217
c.  [F]railer spies:  Who Is Fit to Judge?
When Lord Coke famously declared, ANo man should be a judge of his own case,@218 he was
stating a proposition we regard as self-evident.  Of course no one should be permitted to try a
case in which she is a plaintiff or a defendant.  And, as a corollary, of course no one should be
permitted, as an appellate judge, to hear an appeal from her own judgment.219  But the speaker
in Sonnet 121 espouses a more exacting standard of judicial disqualification:  no one may sit in
judgment unless she is more moral than the parties appearing before her.220  More narrowly, no
one may condemn conduct as wrongful if she herself is guilty of the same kind of wrong.  To
what extent have we adopted (or should we adopt) this standard of judicial conduct today?
Judicial decisions are not self-executing; a judge cannot personally compel compliance with her
rulings.  Without public confidence in her probity and impartiality and without the litigants= 
confidence that she used reason rather than idiosyncrasy to decide their case, she cannot
discharge her duties effectively.  Consequently, we hold judges to stricter standards of conduct
than those applicable to ordinary citizens.221  A judge may not, for instance, Ahold membership
in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion[,] or
national origin,@222 even though an ordinary private citizen may do so with impunity.  And we
require judges to render decisions arrived at Athrough proper judicial method and reasoning@ and
only after they have heard Aall the parties in accordance with prescribed procedures.@223  They
may not sit in judgment if they have committed themselves to a particular result before the
evidence is presented.224
Suppose a judge presiding at a trial for defamation has herself been an unsuccessful plaintiff in a
defamation action.  Should we expect her to be capable of hearing the parties= cases without
predetermination and rendering a decision based solely on the facts and the law?  For example,
would the defendant have reason to fear that the judge would be biased toward the plaintiff
because, as an unsuccessful plaintiff herself, she would be sympathetic to this plaintiff=s pain and
unwilling to see yet another victim denied compensation?  Perhaps.  But the plaintiff might have
equal reason to fear bias toward the defendant because the judge might, in bitterness, prevent
another plaintiff from succeeding where she herself had failed.  The question is not which
outcome is more likely or which party has more to fear from her bias.  There is no way to tell.
Rather, the question is, will she be deciding the case on the basis of particulars that were not part
of the record.  Counsel can argue against the other party=s case, but how can he argue against a
judge=s private history?
Perhaps Aprivate@ is the key word here.  The speaker in the Sonnet, raging against the hypocrisy
of those who judge him, will nonetheless tolerate their judgments if they are willing to exult
openly in their badness rather than nurturing their badness in secret.  W.S. Gilbert, in his comic
opera Trial by Jury, offers a witty example of just such judicial exultation.  Before presiding
over a damages action for breach of promise of marriage, the judge in the opera unblushingly
admits to the assembled crowd that he himself has profited from just such a breach of promise.
Weary of his poverty and obscurity as a young barrister, he calculatedly Afell in love with a rich
attorney=s elderly, ugly daughter.@  And after he became rich as the result of his prospective
father-in-law=s influence, well, let him tell it himself.
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At length I became as rich as the Gurneys [a then-prominent British banking family]
An incubus then I thought her,
So I threw over that rich attorney=s
Elderly, ugly daughter.
The rich attorney my character high
Tried vainly to disparage B
And now, if you please, I=m ready to try
This Breach of Promise of Marriage!225
Today, we would not take kindly to a judge who openly exulted in her questionable past, but we
might respect a judge who disclosed to counsel her possible private interests and history,
allowing counsel to determine whether their clients= interests would be better served by a
different judge.226
In today=s political discourse about judges= qualifications, general ideology seems to have
replaced particularized economic interest as the disqualifying characteristic par excellence,227 
and one often hears denunciations against the appointment of Aactivist judges.@  The term is
invariably used pejoratively, but its meaning is exceptionally fluid, and its deployment seems to
depend on whose ox is being gored.  Often the term is used to excoriate judges who, say their
conservative critics, use their judicial authority to flout the will of the voters.
Speaking to a bipartisan group of [supporters of a federal constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage] at the White House on Monday afternoon, [President
George W.] Bush repeatedly castigated what he called Aactivist judges@ for
thwarting the will of the people on same-sex marriage.  AMarriage is the most
fundamental institution of civilization, and it should not be redefined by activist
judges.@228
A[An amendment to the Minnesota Constitution to ban same-sex marriage] is the only
way to make sure activist judges don=t circumvent the will of the people,@ argued
Rep. Dan Severson, R-Sauk Rapids, the chief sponsor. . . .229
Yet Justice Scalia, who professes the most extreme solicitousness of popular opinion, at least as
to sexual orientation,230 saw fit to vote with the conservative majority of the United States
Supreme Court to strike down widely supported legislation like the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990231 and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.232
When he was a United States Senator, Barack Obama declared that Athe depth and breadth of [a
candidate=s] empathy@ should be a factor in weighing her qualifications for judicial office.233  
When he became President and had to fill the first United States Supreme Court vacancy that
arose during his presidency, his conservative opponents recalled his use of the word Aempathy@ 
and criticized him for it.
Obama has something specific in mind when he talks about empathy.  He wants the
justice=s oath [A. . . that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all
the duties . . .@] to in effect be rewritten.  Judges must administer justice with
respect to persons, they must be partial to the poor, and so on.234
These critics treated Aempathic@ as code for Aliberal.@
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But conservative justices, too, have bolstered their (conservative) decisions by professing
empathy.  In Gonzales v. Carhart,235 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting the medical procedure Adilation and evacuation@ 
(so-called Apartial birth@ abortion), even though the Court had struck down an almost identical 
State prohibition seven years earlier in Stenberg v. Carhart.236  Both were 5-4 decisions, but
because the pro-choice Justice O=Connor had been replaced by the anti-abortion Justice Alito,
Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in Stenberg, found himself in the Gonzales majority and
wrote the opinion of the Court.  In that opinion, he upheld the federal prohibition partly in the
name of empathy for the woman who comes to regret her abortion after the fact.237  And in 
Lawrence v. Texas,238 which declared unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to have sexual contact with each other, Justice Scalia, in his dissent,
expressed empathy for those who are repelled by homosexuality and whose aversion is not
shared by the Alaw-profession culture.@239
When President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court, conservative opponents of the nominee cited an injudicious speech she had delivered in
2001 in which she declared that a Latina judge, by virtue of her life experiences, would Amore
often than not reach a better conclusion [as a judge] than a white male@ would.240  Former
Republican Governor of Arkansas Mike Huckabee, reacting in 2009 to the news of this 2001
speech, stated, AIf she is confirmed, then we need to take the blindfold off Lady Justice.@241  If
Governor Huckabee was suggesting that Lady Justice has always been blindfolded until now
and, but for Sotomayor=s nomination, would remain blindfolded, I would have to disagree.  The
holdings of conservative justices strongly suggest that the blindfold has come off before.
In every major case since he became the nation=s seventeenth Chief Justice, Roberts has
sided with the prosecution over the defendant, the state over the condemned, the
executive branch over the legislative, and the corporate defendant over the
individual plaintiff.242
While it is not impossible that an ideologically detached justice would coincidentally favor the
more powerful party B prosecution, the state, and the corporation B in each of these particular
cases, the fact that the Chief Justice=s positions have Aserved the interest, and reflected the
values, of the contemporary Republican party@243 powerfully suggests another explanation for
his positions.  The decisions of Justice Rehnquist also, after his first four years on the bench,
were observed to produce ideologically predictable results:
(1) Conflicts between an individual and the government should, whenever
possible, be resolved against the individual;
(2) Conflicts between state and federal authority . . . should, wherever
possible, be resolved in favor of the states; and
(3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . should, wherever
possible, be resolved against such exercise.244
In criticizing the conservatives= appropriation of Aactivism@, Aempathy@, and ideology-based
decisionmaking as bêtes noires in the process of judge-selection, I have relied on a type of
fallacious argument known as Tu Quoque (AYou do it yourself@).  Not coincidentally (given the
aim of this article), the speaker in Sonnet 121 falls into the same rhetorical trap.  He responds to
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his traducers= accusations of licentiousness by accusing them of licentiousness.  But such a
response is not a logical refutation.  It does not refute his traducers= explicit claim that he is
licentious, nor does it refute their implicit claim that licentiousness is a bad thing.  It simply says, 
AYou, too.@  When conservatives criticize liberal judges for being Aactivist@ and I respond by
pointing out the Aactivism@ of conservative judges, I have not refuted the conservatives= explicit
claim that liberal judges are activist, nor have I refuted their implicit claim that Aactivist@ is a bad
thing for a judge to be.  Still, my response of Ayou, too@ is not wholly without point.  It exposes
the hypocrisy B or at least the disingenuousness B of their criticism.  If activism per se were what
disturbed the conservative critics, presumably the judges these critics admire B Justices Scalia
and Thomas, for instance245 B would not be activist.  That these famously conservative judges 
are activist demonstrates that something else is disturbing these conservative critics.  Presumably
they object to activism on behalf of liberal causes but not to activism on behalf of conservative
causes.  The tu quoque criticism therefore rebuts the conservatives= claim to the moral high
ground of judicial neutrality.
I have avoided using the word Aneutral@ until now, even though it is a word one often hears in
this context,246 because I am not altogether sure that true neutrality is attainable, or even
desirable, unless we prefer judges who are not made of flesh and blood.  At the time of this
writing, the issue of same-sex marriage dominates much of the discussion about the judiciary=s
proper role, and when it came to light that a few gay people were on President Obama=s short list
of judicial candidates to fill the seat held by Justice Souter, some opponents of same-sex
marriage complained that putting a gay judge on the bench would be Aputting a vote for same-sex
marriage on the highest court in the land.@247  This objection to gay candidates presupposes that
a gay judge can be depended on to support same-sex marriage rights, and the objection is
wrong-headed in two respects.  First, some gay scholars oppose same-sex marriage.  Paula
Ettelbrick, for example, argues that Amarriage runs contrary to two of the primary goals of the
lesbian and gay movement:  the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the validation of
many forms of relationships.@248  A second and more serious flaw in this particular objection to
gay judges is that the objection presupposes that heterosexual judges are neutral on issues
relating to equality for gay people, as if gay people are the only ones who have sexual
orientation.  Heterosexual people can have strong predispositions about homosexuality, too.  Had
Justice Thurgood Marshall recused himself from Supreme Court cases involving discrimination
against African-Americans, he would have been suggesting that white people are neutral on
racial issues while people of color are not, as if white people have no race.  As Martha Minow
observed, AThere is no neutrality, no escape from choice.@249  And if judges are necessarily
choice-makers, making their choices on the basis of their outlooks,250 perhaps consideration of
a judicial candidate=s personal perspective is not so misguided after all.
IV.  Conclusion
The mind that created King Lear and The Merchant of Venice was not dormant or in hiding when
it produced the Sonnets.  These lyric poems display the same powers of invention, the same
penetrating insight into the human mind and heart, that have prompted legal scholars to turn to
the plays for inspiration.  The language of the Sonnets may be less immediately accessible than
that of the plays, but the persevering, receptive scholar is sure to find in these poems elegant and
provocative approaches to a host of legal problems.  And, perhaps most important to me in my
own line of work, the Sonnets bear out my admonition to skeptical students who complain that
the difference between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent is merely a matter of
words:  AWords matter!@
     
1My title echoes the opening of one of William Wordsworth=s sonnets (not one of my favorites, as it happens):
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Scorn not the Sonnet; Critic, you have frowned,
Mindless of its just honours; with this key
Shakespeare unlocked his heart; the melody
Of this small lute gave ease to Petrarch=s wound;
William Wordsworth, AScorn Not the Sonnet@, in 2 Major British writers 108 (G.B. Harrison et al, eds. 1959) (1827).
     
2Almost as often, everyone loves to misquote him.  How often have you heard B or perhaps even used B the phrase A
gild the lily@?  This is a misquotation of Shakespeare=s King John.  In Act Four, the Earl of Salisbury seeks to dissuade
John, who has already been crowned once, from ordering a second coronation, on the ground that such a repetition
would be Awasteful and ridiculous excess.@  Act 4, sc. 2, line 16.  In advancing his argument, the earl offers John some
other examples of excess, and among those examples we find:
To gild refinèd gold, to paint the lily.  [line 11]
To paint a lily is a redundant act, since lilies are already brightly colored.  To gild gold is a redundant act, since gold is
already gilded.  But a lily is not already gilded, so to gild a lily is not a redundant act but a potentially improving one.
Thus, the correct phrase B correct as to both sense and literary accuracy B is Apaint the lily.@
     
3Professor Charles Fried provided a noteworthy exception to my observation.  Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the A
Black Ink@ of the Framers= Intention, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751 (1987).
     
4Wordsworth expressed a view still popular today when he suggested that Shakespeare Aunlocked his heart@ in these
Sonnets.  See note 1, supra.  Robert Browning replied mordantly to Wordsworth=s suggestion, AIf so, the less
Shakespeare he,@ Robert Browning, AHouse@, in 2 Major British Writers, supra note 1, at 575 (1874), and I tend to
agree with Browning.  Despite the tantalizing puns that Shakespeare=s speaker makes on the name Will in Sonnets 135
and 136 and the elusive references in Sonnets 110 and 111 to the speaker=s possible appearance on a public stage, I find
in the Sonnets no foundation on which to construct even the most tentative anatomy of Shakespeare=s inner life.  I
regard them not as confessions (except insofar as all art is perforce confessional) but as intellectual exercises
undertaken for their own sake or perhaps to please friends or patrons.
     
5Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare=s Sonnets 3 (1997).
     
6The mutation is often syntactical, as when Shakespeare puts a common word to uncommon use by altering its part
of speech.  In the first sonnet that I discuss in detail, Sonnet 35, Shakespeare uses the adjective Aamiss@ as a noun.  (He
does so in Sonnet 151 as well.)  In sonnet 6, he transforms the adjective Ahappy@ into a verb:
Which happies those that pay the willing loan.
And one of the most notable affectations of contemporary corporatespeak B using Atask@ as a verb B can actually boast a
Shakespearean antecedent:
O! Lest the world should task you to recite [Sonnet 72].
This rhetorical device B altering a word=s conventional part of speech B is known as anthimeria, and Shakespeare
employs it frequently.  In Hamlet=s famous ATo be or not to be@ soliloquy, for example, we find these lines B 
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o=er with the pale cast of thought,
Hamlet, act 3, sc. 1, lines 83-84 (emphasis added) B where the adjective sickly has become a verb.
Sometimes in the Sonnets Shakespeare treats us to the conventional and unconventional use of the same word in
a single line.  In Sonnet 18:
And every fair [noun] from fair [adjective] sometime declines;
and in Sonnet 69:
Thy outward [noun] thus with outward [adjective] praise is crown=d.
But occasionally he seems to lose control over his own virtuosity and goes too far in cleverness:
For as you were when first your eye I ey=d [Sonnet 104].
     
7This phrase is Helen Vendler=s.  Helen Vendler, supra note 5, at xiii.
     
8Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, in The Concise Columbia Book of Poetry 47 (William Harmon, ed., 1990).
Shelley=s sonnet offers a splendid example of ironic equivocation.  Addressed to the ancient king=s contemporaries, the
words of the inscription warned of the futility of opposing him.  Addressed to the poet=s contemporaries, the inscription
seems to warn of the futility of seeking a permanent glory.  Thus, the king=s own words have subverted themselves.
     
9These sentiments about the poet=s art B sentiments that I have imputed somewhat fancifully to Shelley B were
voiced quite explicitly by the Latin poet Horace more than 1,800 years before AOzymandias@ was written:  AExegi
monumentum aere perennius@ (AI have erected a monument more durable than bronze@).  Horace, Book III, Ode XXX, in
The Complete Odes and Satires of Horace 150 (Sidney Alexander, trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1999).
     
10William Wordsworth, ANuns Fret Not at Their Convent=s Narrow Room@, in 2 Major British Writers, supra note
1, at 101 (1804).  Unlike the Wordsworth sonnet that I quoted earlier, see supra note 1, this one is one of my favorites.
     
11See supra note 4.
     
12George Orwell, 1984 214 (Signet Books 1961) (1949).
     
13Letter to George and Thomas Keats, dated Dec. 22, 1817, in The Complete Poetical Works and Letters of John
Keats 276-77 (Houghton Mifflin 1899).
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14Id.
     
15The delicacy and humor of Shakespeare=s sympathy find many illustrations, but one of my favorites comes from 
Romeo and Juliet.  Shortly after her first conversation with Romeo at a party, Juliet, obviously smitten, wants to find
out who this young man is.  But instead of coming right out and asking her gossipy nurse for the young man=s name,
Juliet slyly asks her for the names of two other men first, as if to suggest that her interest in the third-mentioned Romeo
is merely the same idle curiosity that prompted her inquiries about the other two.  Act 1, sc. 5, lines 128-35.
It is worth noting that fourteen of the consecutive lines spoken by Romeo and Juliet in their first conversation
form a perfect Shakespearean sonnet, even though the lines are allocated between the two characters as seven separate
speeches.  Act 1, sc. 5, lines 93-106.
     
16Deuteronomy says, AJustice, justice, thou shalt pursue.@  We are adjured to Apursue@ it; Aattainment@ is not
expected.
     
17The Merchant of Venice, Act 1, sc. 2, lines 80-83.
     
18Helen Vendler, supra note 5, at xiv.
     
19Most of the lines in Shakespeare=s Sonnets contain 10 syllables, ending in what is called a masculine rhyme (that
is, a rhyme in which the final syllable is accented, such as Aobey@ and Adelay@).  Accordingly, a sonnet using only
masculine rhymes would comprise 140 syllables.  But Shakespeare occasionally employed feminine rhymes (that is,
rhymes in which the final syllable is unaccented, such as Acherish@ and Aperish@), which add an eleventh syllable to each
line containing such a rhyme.  In Sonnet 20, for instance, every line ends with a feminine rhyme, so that sonnet
comprises 154 syllables.  In Sonnet 145, Shakespeare used tetrameter (8-syllable lines) instead of pentameter
(10-syllable lines), so that sonnet comprises only 112 syllables.  And Sonnet 126 confounds all expectations by
consisting of only 12 lines instead of 14, some of which end in masculine rhymes and some in feminine.
     
20See, e.g., note 27, infra.
     
21AAccessary@ and Aaccessory@ are alternate spellings.  The 1609 Quarto version of the Sonnets (the first published
version of the complete Sonnets) uses the first spelling.
Shakespeare seems to have been familiar with English legal process.  In the plays, as well, we find examples of
terms of legal art used in surprising ways.  In the opening scene of Othello, for instance, Iago uses the term Anonsuit@ 
when he complains of being passed over for the position of Othello=s second-in-command:
Three great ones of the city,  In personal suit to make me his lieutenant,  Off-capp'd to
him:  and, by the faith of man,  I know my price, I am worth no worse a place:  But he, as loving his own pride
and purposes,  Evades them, with a bombast circumstance  Horribly stuff'd with epithets of war;  And, in
conclusion,  Nonsuits my mediators . . . .
Othello, act 1, sc. 1, 8-16.
     
22I have mixed feelings about attaching line numbers to my presentation of each sonnet.  As e.e. cummings=s oeuvre 
famously illustrates, a reader=s response to a poem can be affected by the impression it makes on her eye B a picture
framed by the blank space bordering the page B and the presence of line numbers surely distorts that impression.  I can
only hope that their presence is justified in this instance by the resulting convenience in citation.
     
23Shakespeare uses the canker/sweetest-bud image in Sonnet 70 as well:
For canker vice the sweetest buds doth love.
     
24Shakespeare uses vowel rhyme in other sonnets, too.  See, e.g., Sonnets 71, 106, and 145.
     
25Reading this sonnet aloud reveals another aural oddity:  the profusion of sibilants.  The poem contains a total of
forty-seven such sounds (s, x, z, and soft c):  fully one-third of the syllables.  Every line in the poem contains at least
one sibilant, and some contain as many as six:
Excusing thy sins more than thy sins are.
And nine words in the poem contain two sibilants:  Roses, eclipses, sweetest, trespass, Excusing, sins [twice], sense, 
accessary.  This conspicuous deployment of sibilants is a poetic device known as sigmatism, a term derived from the
Greek letter sigma (the Greek s).  Since English is a rather sibilant language to begin with, sigmatism demands
extraordinary frequency in order to be noticed at all.  Wordsworth used this device in a passage about skating in his
autobiographical poem The Prelude.  And Shakespeare uses it in a number of his plays.  In a famous passage in Hamlet
, for example, sigmatism suggests the hissing of a snake:
The serpent that did sting thy father=s life
Now wears his crown.
Act 1, sc. 5, lines 38-39.  And in a soliloquy from King Henry the Fourth, Part Two in which the king complains of his
inability to sleep, Shakespeare ingeniously uses a succession of st sounds, reminiscent of an old form of the traditional
cry for silence:
And in the calmest and most stillest night. . . .
Act 3, sc. 1, line 28.  The sigmatism in Sonnet 35 may suggest the hissing noise that audiences at a melodrama direct at
the villain (and that the speaker in the poem may be directing at himself).  Cf. Julius Caesar:
If the tag-rag people did not clap him and hiss him, according as he pleased and  displeased them, as
they use to do the players in the theatre, I am no true man.
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Act 1, scene 2, lines 258-61.
     
26Shakespeare uses salve as a verb meaning Asoothe,@ as we would today in the phrase Asalve one=s conscience.@  
And, as noted earlier, he uses amiss as a noun.
     
27I have remarked earlier upon Shakespeare=s device of using the same word as two different parts of speech in the
same line.  See supra note 6.  Here, Shakespeare uses an entire phrase, thy sins, in two different senses in the same line,
but the metamorphosis does not relate to part-of-speech but rather to grammatical case.  The first thy sins is
syntactically an object, while the second thy sins is syntactically a subject.
In the 1609 Quarto of the Sonnets, the word Atheir@ appears in this line instead of the word Athy@.
Excusing their sins more than their sins are.
Edward Capell, an eighteenth century Shakespearean critic and scholar, suggested that this was a misprint and that 
their . . . their should be read as thy . . . thy.  Most contemporary scholars accept Capell=s emendation.  I lack the
technical resources to make an independent editorial judgment, so I shall simply accept what these contemporary
scholars have accepted.  Capell=s emendation certainly makes the line more sensible.  If the correct words were their . .
. their, the only plausible antecedent for that pronoun would be All men (line 5), and I do not see why the speaker
should feel specially ashamed of excusing the sins of all men.
This is as good a spot as any for saying a few words about punctuation.  In the 1609 Quarto, the concluding
punctuation mark in this sonnet is a comma, not a period.  Obviously that was a misprint.  Throughout this article I
ignore the Quarto=s punctuation, inasmuch as the Elizabethans and Jacobeans seem not to have established a set of
punctuation rules comparable in their clarity and universality to our modern rules.  Instead, I have studied the
punctuation used in several modern editions of the Sonnets and followed the punctuation choices that seem to me best
calculated to sustain my understanding of the poems.
     
28In line 13, the speaker uses the word accessary.
     
29One of the most famous final couplets comes from Sonnet 116:
If this be error, and upon me prov=d,
I never writ, nor no man ever lov=d.
     
30I say Ararely@ because a few other sonnets can be found in which the sestet is experienced as a unit:  Sonnets 13
and 29, for example.
     
31Sensual is pronounced with only two syllables, ASENSH-wul@, so that the line scans.
     
32The speaker in Sonnets 40, 41, and 42 identifies the beloved=s misconduct precisely as sleeping with the speaker=s
mistress.  The speaker in Sonnet 35 does not.
     
33When Shakespeare employs the same word as two different parts of speech in the same line B one part of speech
being the conventional one, and the other being unconventional, see supra note 6 B the difference in such cases usually
is only syntactical, not denotative.  For example, in Sonnet 18 he uses Afair@ as both an adjective (conventional syntax)
and a noun (unconventional syntax),
And every fair from fair sometime declines,
but even in the unconventional syntax Afair@ still denotes physical beauty.  In Sonnet 35, on the other hand,
Shakespeare employs the opposite device (line 9).  He uses, each in its conventional syntax, two similar words having
an identical etymology yet seemingly antithetic meanings (sensual and sense).
When the sonnet is read aloud, bring in sense sounds exactly like Abring incense,@ a pun that may call to readers= 
minds certain religious ceremonies associated with the forgiveness of sins.  In view of the widespread anti-Catholic
sentiment in Shakespeare=s England,  Shakespeare=s readers may have had a more passionate reaction to the pun than
we.  To those readers, the bringing of incense might have suggested base, cowardly conduct:  the making of a
propitiatory offering to the injurer (the committer of the sensual fault) by the injured.  For some astute B not to say
audacious B speculations on Shakespeare=s own association with Roman Catholicism, see Stephen Greenblatt, Will in
the World (2004).
     
34Observe that the speaker in line 11 uses the single word myself rather than the two words My self that he used in
line 7.  Thus, his meaning in line 11 is that the defendant against whom he brings his plea is, simply, the speaker
himself, without reference to the supposed Atrue >Self.=@  The 1609 quarto uses the two-word form in both lines, but I
agree with those editors who use the two-word form in line 7 and the one-word form in line 11.
The speaker, by using the adjective lawful to modify plea but not to modify advocate in the previous line,
suggests that he is using the adjective to mean something that applies to plea but not to advocate.  If lawful were
intended to mean Aauthorized by law,@ the adjective could have been used in both places with equal justification.
Therefore, lawful signifies something else, and I suggest it means Ajustified@ or Awarranted.@  That is, the speaker
suggests that his excuse-making conduct is worthy of condemnation and that he therefore acts justly when he enters a
plea against himself.  In King Henry the Sixth, Part Three, Queen Margaret uses the word Alawful@ in what seem to be
these two different senses:  first Aauthorized@ and then Ajustified.@  After Margaret=s husband, King Henry the Sixth of
England, is deposed by the Duke of York, Margaret flees to France to obtain the French king=s aid in restoring Henry to
the English throne.
Now, therefore, be it known . . .
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That Henry . . .
Is . . . become a banish=d man,
And forced to live in Scotland . . . ;
While proud ambitious Edward, Duke of York,
Usurps the regal title and the seat
Of England=s true-anointed lawful king.
This is the cause that I, poor Margaret,
. . . 
Am come to crave thy just and lawful aid.
Act 3, scene 3, lines 23-32.
     
35If we read sensual fault [line 9] to refer to a sexual betrayal such as the beloved=s sleeping with the speaker=s
mistress, rob[bery] might also refer to that love-theft.  And the adverb sourly means Awith bitter result.@
     
36In a famous passage in the New Testament, Jesus says to one of the apostles, A[T]hou art Peter, and upon this rock
I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.  And I will give unto thee the keys of the
kingdom of heaven:  and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven:  and whatsoever thou shalt
loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.@  Matthew 16:18-19 (King James version).  From this passage is derived the
doctrine that Jesus directly transmitted his spiritual authority on earth to the apostle Peter during Jesus=s lifetime and
that each pope thereafter has succeeded to that authority by virtue of his election as pope.
     
37Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 74, 98 (1960).  The last of the three quoted sentences comes from a later
scene but relates to the same issue and continues the image of an essential self.
Ironically, playwright Bolt puts into More=s mouth words that strongly echo those spoken by More=s adversary,
Martin Luther, when confronting his Catholic accusers at the Diet of Worms:  AHere I stand!  I cannot do otherwise.@  
(Of course, Luther=s actual words were German:  Hier stehe ich!  Ich kann nicht anders.)
     
38Id.  The historical Thomas More would strike us today as a bigot.  Before More=s break with King Henry the
Eighth, More, in his official capacity as the King=s chancellor, enthusiastically persecuted and burned Protestants as A
heretics.@  Jasper Ridley, Henry VIII 142, 197-98 (1985).
     
39Id.
     
40398 U.S. 333 (1970).  The opinion that was premised on statutory construction grounds was only a plurality
opinion.  Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, but his reasons were constitutional, not statutory.  Id. at 344-68
(Harlan, J., concurring).
     
41Universal Military Training and Service Act ' 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. ' 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
     
42398 U.S. at 337.
     
43Id. at 340.
     
44Id. at 342-43.
     
45See supra note 37.
     
46See, e.g., In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 32-35 (1975).
     
47See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling:  An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1273, 1309-11 (1999).
     
48In this sonnet, and not for the last time, Shakespeare uses compare as a noun, meaning comparison.  See note 65, 
infra.  Again, this device is known as an anthimeria.  See supra note 6.
     
49See, e.g., Terence Moore, Blind Loyalty to Vick Is Blind, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Aug. 12, 2007, at 1E;
David Whitley, Sacking Vick with a Rush to Judgment OK in This Case, Baltimore Sun, Aug. 22, 2007, at 2E.
     
50Adam Liptak, Furor Ends in Deanship for Liberal Scholar, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2007, at A16.
     
51Id.
     
52Id.
     
53See Francine D=Amico, Race-ing and Gendering the Military Closet, in Gay Rights, Military Wrongs:  Political
perspectives on Lesbians and Gays in the Military 3, 5 (Craig A. Rimmerman, ed., 1996) (hereinafter AGays in the
Military@).  The longer, more official name for the new policy was Adon=t ask, don=t tell, don=t pursue.@  Id.
     
54Marine Col. Fred Peck, appearing as a witness before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in a
hearing dealing with the military=s anti-gay ban, testified that he would not want his gay son to join the Marine Corps:
not because he was afraid that his son=s presence would interfere with morale or Aunit cohesion@ but because he was
afraid that his son would be beaten up by the other Marines.  139 Cong. Rec. S. 8749, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., July 15,
1993.
     
55See David Ari Bianco, Echoes of Prejudice:  The Debates Over Race and Sexuality in the Armed Forces, in Gays
in the Military, supra note 53, at 47, 53.
     
56Id. at 54.
     
57Randall Kennedy, The Marriage Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 781, 789.
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58In 1922, the president of Harvard University, A. Lawrence Lowell, recommended that the university impose a
quota on Jewish students as a way of reducing anti-Semitism on campus.  See Jerry Kang, Negative Actions Against
Asian Americans:  The Internal Instability of Dworkin=s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1,
40 n.188 (1996).
     
59See a letter from Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to then Congresswoman Patricia
Schroeder (D-Colo.), quoted in id. at 47.  The African-American community is by no means unanimous in its rejection
of the analogy between the barring of gay people from the military and the former barring of African-Americans from
the military.  Carl Rowan, an African-American journalist, wrote a column for the Chicago Sun-Times urging this very
analogy as an argument against maintaining the anti-gay ban.  Pointedly, he coupled a racist quote from a white Navy
seaman in 1944 (AI=ll be court-martialed before I=ll take orders from a damn nigger@) with a homophobic quote from a
black Navy seaman in 1993 (AI=ll quit the Navy before I=ll serve on a ship with a known queer@).  Carl T. Rowan, Issue
of Justice Is Becoming Excuse for an Orgy of Hate, Chi. Sun-Times, May 14, 1993, at 43.  It should also be noted that
Professor Randall Kennedy, whom I cite approvingly on several occasions, see, e.g., supra note 57, is also
African-American.
     
60Regarding the canard as applied to gay people, see, for example,
http://www.jesus-is-savior.com/Evils%20in%20America/Sodomy/pederasts.htm (AThe homosexual activist movement
and organized pedophiles are linked together by a common goal:  To gain access to children for seduction into
homosexuality.@).  Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), as part of an effort to continue banning gay people from the
military, Avisited cramped showers and bathrooms to demonstrate how little privacy there is on an aircraft carrier or
submarine, [thus reinforcing] one of the most widely held negative stereotypes of homosexuals:  that gays are always
promiscuous and allowing them to live in such close proximity to members of the same sex invites trouble.@  Editorial, 
Gay Rights Are Nonnegotiable, Chi. Sun-Times, May 14, 1993, at 41.  Regarding the canard as applied to
African-Americans, consider a speech delivered on the floor of the United States Senate in 1907 by Senator Ben
Tillman (D.-S.C.) in support of the lynching of any Black man believed to have raped a white woman:
When stern and sad-faced white men put to death a creature in human form who has deflowered a white
woman, they have avenged the greatest wrong, the blackest crime in all the category of crimes. . . . Look
at our environment in the South, surrounded, and in a very large number of counties, outnumbered by
the negroes B engulfed, as it were, in a black flood of semi-barbarians. . . . Their minds are those of
children, while they have the passions and strength of men. . . . [T]he white women of the South are in a
state of siege. . . .
41 Cong. Rec. 1441 (1907).
     
61Charles Moskos, Why Banning Homosexuals Still Makes Sense, Navy Times, Mar. 30, 1992, at 27.
     
62See also Randall Kennedy, supra note 57, at 792.
Another reason given for rejecting the analogy between oppression of gay people and oppression of black people
is the belief that homosexuality, unlike race, is a choice.  Crystal Dixon, an administrator at the University of Toledo,
wrote in a letter to the editor of the online edition of the Toledo (Ohio) Free Press:
I take great umbrage at the notion that those choosing the homosexual lifestyle are Acivil rights victims.@  
Here=s why.  I cannot wake up tomorrow and not be a black woman.
John Seewer (AP writer), Univ. Of Toledo Official Fired Over Column Sues,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081202/ap_on_re_us/column_controversy_1 (visited Dec. 4, 2008).  Without bothering
to refute Ms. Dixon=s notion that homosexuality is a choice, I would point out that religion clearly is a choice, yet there
is no doubt that discrimination on the basis of religion is Acivil rights@ discrimination.  Professor Kennedy makes my
point far more eloquently:
Racial oppression would not be one whit less dreadful and needful of judicial (and other forms of)
intervention if blacks were somehow afforded the option of changing their color. . . . [A]n appreciable
number of blacks have complexions that allow them to be perceived as Awhite.@  But blacks who can A
pass@ should receive no less protection from racial oppression than Avisible@ blacks even though the
former could, if they wished, blend in with the white majority. . . . The ability of people to Apass,@ 
convert, retreat into a closet, or go underground should provide no basis for lessened attention to
invidious discriminations.
Randall Kennedy, supra note 57, at 794.
     
63Clarence Page, Injustice Is Bigger Than Jena 6, Chi. Trib., Sept. 24, 2007, at 19.
     
64See Gloria Steinem, Why Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2008, at A23.  Ms. Steinem
wrote, for example, ABlack men were given the vote a half-century before women of any race were allowed to mark a
ballot.@  Id.  While that observation is undoubtedly true (in federal elections, at least), it hardly constitutes proof that
women have suffered more discrimination than black men.  After all, the number of women who were lynched for
assertive behavior during that half-century was, I am quite confident, rather small.  Conversely, when Barack Obama=s
erstwhile Chicago minister, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, observed that AHillary [Clinton] ain=t never been called a >
nigger=,@ Obama Minister Under Scrutiny, Mar. 14, 2008, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/ (Visited Mar. 14, 2008),
he was undoubtedly correct, but then I very much doubt that Barack Obama has ever been called a Acunt@.
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65Sonnet 130, AMy mistress= eyes are nothing like the sun,@ is best read as an ironic deflation of an imagined blazon.
A blazon is a form of verse in which the poet catalogues his lady=s physical excellences and praises them extravagantly.
The blazon Shakespeare imagined might have begun with a line like AMy mistress= eyes shine brightly as the sun;@ and
Shakespeare=s speaker responds with pointed simplicity, AMy mistress= eyes are nothing like the sun.@  And lest the
reader mistake the speaker=s remarks for loveless indifference, the speaker ends the sonnet with the following couplet:
And yet by heav=n I think my love as rare
As any she belied with false compare.
There=s that noun compare again.  And note that Shakespeare uses the pronoun she as a noun, meaning Awoman.@
     
66See, e.g., supra notes 6, 26.
     
67See supra note 6.
     
68See Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind 328, 365 (Warner Books 1999) (1936).
     
69See, e.g., http://www.americanpregnancy.org/labornbirth/birthingcenter.html (visited on January 23, 2008).
     
70Gary Bellow & Bea Molton, The Lawyering Process (1978).  I think the single word Lawyering would have been
a more graceful title.
     
71The Oxford English Dictionary states that such use of Aparent@ as a verb is Arare before 20th cent,@ and that the
use of the gerund Aparenting@ is strictly of U.S. origin.
     
72Benjamin Spock, M.D. & Michael B. Rothenberg, M.D., Baby and Child Care 1 (E.P. Dutton 1985) (1945).
     
73The term Abreeder@ is sometimes applied contemptuously by people without children to parents whose attitudes
suggest that they feel entitled to special deference simply because they have managed to produce offspring.
     
74Joan Acocella, The Child Trip, New Yorker Magazine, Nov. 17, 2008, at 100, 100, reviewing two books on the
subject of Ahothouse parenting:@  A Nation of Wimps:  The High Cost of Invasive Parenting by Hara Estroff Marano,
and Under Pressure:  The New Movement Inspiring Us to Slow Down, Trust Our Instincts, and Enjoy Our Kids, by
Carl Honoré.
     
75Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 42 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md.
1991); State v. Maurico, 568 A.2d 879, 883 (N.J. 1990).
George Bernard Shaw applies this distinction more broadly:
If you strike a child, take care that you strike it in anger, even at the risk of maiming it for life.  A blow
in cold blood neither can nor should be forgiven.
George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman, Maxims for Revolutionists (1903).
     
76Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 571 (4th ed. 2006).
     
77Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220  (1862) (emphasis omitted).
     
78Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?:  Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 Minn. L. Rev.
959, 973 (2002) (footnote omitted).
     
79Premeditated homicide is probably the classic kind of homicide that cannot be mitigated by proof of adequate
provocation; it is murder in the first degree.  George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 253 (1978).
     
80Such discovery is perhaps the paradigmatic example of an adequate provocation.  See Joshua Dressler, supra note
76, at 572-73.
     
81John Milton, Paradise Lost Book 1, in Paradise Lost and Other Poems, 97, 100 (Maurice Kelley, ed., Walter J.
Black, Inc. 1943).  To say that these sentiments are Milton=s is somewhat misleading.  True, Milton wrote these words,
but he put them into the mouth of Satan.  And he has Satan remark, somewhat inconsistently and only a few lines later:
Better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven.
Id. at 100.
     
82
  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, dealing with public service, expect an attorney ordinarily to be 
willing to undertake such representation:
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as . .
. (c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or
the lawyer=s ability to represent the client.
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 6.2.
     
83Steven Keeva, Why Lawyers Lose in Love, 91 A.B.A.J. 76 (2005).
     
84In today=s parlance, the word Amistress@ generally connotes vice.  It is often applied to the steady female sexual
partner of a married man to whom she is not married, especially when she receives financial support from him.  In the
Sonnets, on the other hand, Shakespeare=s speaker uses the word Amistress@ the way we might use the word Asweetheart
@:  a woman who is being courted.  See, e.g., Sonnets 127 and 130.
     
85The sequence begins with Sonnet 127:  AIn the old age black was not counted fair.@
     
86ATrue@ as a synonym for Asexually faithful@ is not entirely archaic.  Even today, we speak of being true to one=s
spouse, and the very word Abetrothal@ has truth as its root.
     
87Lorenz Hart acknowledged this possibility in his sardonic lyrics for one of the best-known songs in the Rodgers
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& Hart canon:
The furtive sigh,
The blackened eye,
The words AI=ll love you till the day I die,@
The self-deception that believes the lie B
I wish I were in love again.
Lorenz Hart, I Wish I Were in Love Again, in The Complete Lyrics of Lorenz Hart 228 (Dorothy Hart & Robert
Kimball, eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1986) (1937).
     
88The speaker could easily have said AIgnorant of the world=s false subtleties@ instead of Unlearnèd in the world=s
false subtleties.  Both lines scan properly in iambic pentameter.
     
89Vainly certainly means Afutilely@, as in the phrase Astruggling vainly.@  But vainly can also mean Aconceitedly@ or A
arrogantly@, so the speaker=s choice of this particular adverb also suggests that the speaker=s vanity B vanity as to his
youthful appearance and demeanor or vanity as to the skill of his imposture B may underlie this self-deception.
     
90The speaker certainly could have been more direct.  AAlthough she knows full well that I am old@ could have
replaced the language of line 6 and still fitted the requirements of iambic pentameter.
The negative adjectives that the speaker uses earlier to describe the spurious self he strove to present B untutored 
and unlearnèd B might themselves be characterized as litotes, albeit compressed ones.
     
91Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time 133 (1994).
     
92See William Shakespeare, As You Like It act 2, sc. 7, line 120.
     
93My favorite litotes comes from a story by Saki (H.H. Munro).  He wrote a series of fictional sketches about one
Reginald:  a vain, foppish, indolent young man without any scruples.  His remarks during a conversation with a
duchess prompted her to reflect that AReginald did not exceed the ethical standard which circumstances demanded.@  
H.H. Monro, Reginald at the Theatre, in The Short Stories of Saki 7, 7 (Viking Press 1958) (1904).
     
94Oscar Wilde had some fun illustrating what Coleridge, writing quite seriously, called the willing suspension of
disbelief.  In this scene from The Importance of Being Earnest, a distrustful Gwendolen puts a question to her fiancé:
Gwendolen.  Mr. Worthing, what explanation can you offer to me for pretending to have a brother?
Was it in order that you might have an opportunity of coming up to town to see me as often as possible?
Jack.  Can you doubt it, Miss Fairfax?
Gwendolen.  I have the gravest doubts upon the subject.  But I intend to crush them.
Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, in Plays of Oscar Wilde 247, 301 (Penguin 1982) (1895).
     
95Songwriter Stephen Sondheim illustrated the malleability of the word simple in a song from his musical comedy 
A Little Night Music.  Fredrik, a middle-aged widower, has married a woman who is too young and untutor=d for him.
(Indeed, she has refused to let him consummate the marriage.)  In a duet with his former mistress, Desirée, he
cluelessly catalogues for her what he wants to suppose are his new wife=s excellent qualities, but Desirée is not fooled.
[Fredrik]
She dotes on--
[Desirée] Your dimple! [Fredrik]
My snoring.
[Desirée]
How dear. [Fredrik] The point is, she's really simple. [Desirée] Yes, that much seems clear.
Stephen Sondheim, A Little Night Music, in Best American Plays, 8th Series 182, 198-99 (Clive Barnes, ed. 1983)
(1973).
     
96[H]abit has at least two possible meanings in line 11.  It might mean Acustomary behavior@, in which case the line
suggests that lovers are best off conducting themselves as if they trusted each other.  Or it might mean Aapparel@, in
which case the line suggests that lovers are best off wearing a costume (assuming a disguise) of apparent trust.
Line 11 also contains the word seeming.  The speaker in this sonnet takes a tolerant view of Aseeming@:  more
tolerant than, say, Hamlet.
Seems, madam?  Nay, it is.  I know not Aseems@.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, sc. 2, line 76.
     
97See supra note 6.
     
98In line 1, love is a noun meaning Alover@ or Abeloved@.  In line 11, it is a noun referring to the emotion love.  In
line 12, the first love is a noun referring to people who are in love, and the second love is a verb.
The use of the same word in more than one of its possible senses is a figure of speech called an antanaclasis.
Shakespeare used the device frequently:  in Othello, for instance, where Othello says
Put out the light and then put out the light.
Othello, act 5, sc. 2, line 7.  The first light means Aillumination@, while the second light means ADesdemona=s life@.
While antanaclasis can be employed seriously, as in Othello, it is perhaps more often employed comically:  as a pun.
History credits Benjamin Franklin with an antanaclasis uttered at the signing of the Declaration of Independence:  AWe
must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.@  John Bartlett, Bartlett=s Familiar Quotations 320
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(Justin Kaplan, ed., Little, Brown & Co., 17th ed. 2002) (italics added).  And the final couplet in Shakespeare=s Sonnet
138 turns on an antanaclasis involving the word lie:  meaning both Aspeak falsely@ and Aengage in sexual intercourse.@
     
99Many artists before and since Shakespeare have observed that lies often make life more liveable, but their
observations are generally made in a censorious, or at least regretful, spirit.  In Henrik Ibsen=s play The Wild Duck, on
the other hand, a rather cynical doctor declares with bitter certitude, AI try to discover the Basic Lie B the pet illusion B 
that makes life possible; and then I foster it. . . . Rob the average man of his basic lie and you rob him of his happiness
as well.@  Henrik Ibsen, The Wild Duck 103, 194, 195 (Modern Library; Eva Le Gallienne, trans. 1961) (1884).  What
makes the sonnet=s speaker=s declaration so different from the doctor=s is the composure with which the speaker
expresses it.
     
100See Helen Vendler, supra note 5, at 587.
